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I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that one of the advantages of federalism is that states
serve as laboratories for novel social and political experiments without
risk to the country as a whole. 1 Nowhere are the state laboratories
harder at work than in judicial selection and retention—there are almost
as many systems in place to select and retain judges as there are states in
the union, and tweaks to the various systems are constantly being
proposed.
This diversity of state selection and retention methods reflects a
disagreement about the normative role of judges and about the proper
balance between the instrumental goods of judicial independence and
judicial accountability. For example, California subjects its high-court
judges to periodic retention elections. In 1986, Chief Justice Bird was
voted out of office after she had voted to overturn the death sentence in
each of the fifty-nine capital cases that she heard after 1978. 2 For states
that provide for lifetime appointments for judges, this kind of ouster
presents an intolerable threat to judicial independence. But, for the
people of California, this may exemplify precisely the kind of
accountability that motivated their use of retention elections.3 Similarly,
concern that the Texas Supreme Court was too plaintiff-friendly drove

1. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
2. Voters and Judges, BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION (Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los
Angeles, Cal.), Spring 1998, at 2, available at http://www.crf-usa.org/bria/bria14_2.html.
3. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1447-48 (2003).
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the electorate to replace many Democratic judges with Republican
judges, and it is widely agreed that this change substantially altered the
trajectory of the court. 4 Again, some would decry this as an
impermissible intrusion on judicial independence, while others would
laud this as a victory for accountability.
Although disagreement about the proper balance between judicial
independence and accountability forms the heart of the debate about
judicial elections, those engaged on both sides of the debate often end up
talking past each other. This is because elections are usually thought of
as a method of “judicial selection,” 5 but judicial elections’ greatest threat
to judicial independence comes, not when elections are used to select
judges, but instead when they are used to retain judges. As I hope to
make clear in this Article, the core concerns raised on both sides of the
elections debate—judicial independence and judicial accountability—
have much less to do with judicial selection than they do with judicial
re-selection, or judicial retention.
Many commentators discussing judicial elections have used
“selection” when referring to “retention,” 6 and scholars tend to blur
together three different, though sometimes overlapping, categories of
arguments: (1) arguments attacking elections as a selection method; (2)
arguments attacking elections as a retention method; and (3) arguments

4. Anthony Champagne & Kyle Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a Case
Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 912-16 (2001); George Parker Young et al., “A Rough Sense of
Justice” or “Practical Politics”? Recent Texas Supreme Court Opinions on Causation, 46 THE
ADVOC. (TEX.) 1, 2 (2009).
5. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 4 (Routledge 2009); Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J.
850, 849 n.47 (1972); Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986); Kyle Cheek,
Reconciling Normative and Empirical Approaches to Judicial Selection Reform: Lessons from a
Bellwether State, 68 ALB. L. REV. 577, 577 (2005).
6. See, e.g., BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 10 (stating that “Table 1.2 displays several
of these important features for the thirty-eight states using some form of elections to select their
supreme courts” when, in reality, Table 1.2 shows the thirty-eight states using some form of election
to retain their supreme court judges); Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Judicial Appointments for Life by the
Executive Branch of Government: Reflections on the Massachusetts Experience, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1103, 1111 (1966) (“The defenders of some element of popular election in the process of judicial
selection see in an election the machinery by which, in what is hopefully the unusual or exceptional
case, a judge may be removed.”); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial
Selection and Their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
125, 135 (2007) (“[T]he Justice Bird situation begins to look like the kind of accountability that
many believe judicial selection systems should foster: the ability of the public to remove judges
from office who, although they may not have violated a judicial canon or engaged in conduct that
would result in impeachment, have displayed a continuous course of conduct that shows a disregard
for precedence and law.”).
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against any retention at all (that is, arguments that posit that judges must
have life tenure or serve for only a single term). 7 These distinctions
matter because many states that select judges by appointment retain
them by popular election. Moreover, some commentators seem to
assume that, if a state abandons judicial elections, the state will
inevitably embrace life-tenured judges, 8 when, in fact, most states that
do not hold judicial elections still subject their judges to some form of
periodic retention evaluation (usually one in which the judges must be
reappointed by the executive or reconfirmed by the legislature).9
This Article attempts to reframe the age-old judicial election
arguments into a discussion about the importance of the retention
decision, in order to draw out the areas of true disagreement in the
judicial independence/judicial accountability debate. I argue that the
core difficulties in balancing the desire for judicial independence with
the desire for judicial accountability stem primarily from the judicial
retention decision, regardless of whether retention is obtained by some
form of reelection or through a form of reappointment. I then propose a
two-term system for putting judges on state high courts, in which (1)
high court judges sit for an initial term of relatively short duration (for
example, five or six years); and (2) following the initial term, those
judges are eligible for a longer, final term (for example, ten or twelve
years), after which the judge would be ineligible for further retention. I
argue that this proposed system would better balance judicial
accountability and judicial independence than the systems currently in
place.
Part II of this Article briefly surveys the various systems currently
7. See, e.g., BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 4 (“Interestingly, selection schemes in
which judges are appointed are being touted in today’s political dialogue as promoting
independence from the electorate and other political actors. As the argument goes, judges should be
free to make decisions independent of as many constraints and political factors as possible.”);
Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719,
724 (2010) (“The majoritarian difficulty is not simply an unfortunate byproduct of judicial
elections; it is intrinsic to voting judges into office.”); but see Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention
to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians,
21 YALE L. & POL. REV. 301, 350-51 (2003) (“With the concept of reelection, however, there was
an additional threat to independence that was (and is) absent from the federal system and all systems
giving judges life tenure.”).
8. Professor Geyh has written that, “[w]ithout elections, re-selection becomes irrelevant
(unless one adopts a Virginia or South Carolina model, with legislative reappointment).” Charles
Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 623, 638 (2012).
9. Only three states grant their high court judges some form of life tenure. Nine states retain
judges by a method other than popular election. For a further breakdown, see Table 1 in the
Appendix.
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in place for selection and retention of state high court judges. Part III
examines the most common and enduring arguments raised in the
judicial elections debate—arguments related to the dueling instrumental
goods of independence and accountability—to distinguish those
arguments directed toward judicial selection from those arguments
directed toward judicial retention.
Building on Part III, Part IV will identify retention-related
considerations other than elections that play an important role in a
judge’s independence and accountability. Specifically, Part IV will
suggest that term length and term limits are as important to the
accountability/independence dynamic as the mechanism used to retain
judges and can be used to increase desirable independence in those
jurisdictions where judges periodically stand for re-election. 10 Finally,
Part V will offer a specific proposal for using term length and tenure
limits to enhance independence even where elections are used to retain
judges.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTION AND RETENTION SYSTEMS
A brief overview of the various systems for selecting and retaining
judges on state high courts is necessary before we proceed further. In
theory, one could mix and match any selection method with any
retention method (e.g., an appointive selection mechanism with retention
through partisan elections, or selection through partisan elections with
lifetime tenure), but in practice some selection methods are uniformly
associated with a particular retention method.
Five selection mechanisms are used to put judges on the bench. 11
First, judges in eight states undergo partisan public elections. 12 Judges
10. State lawmakers have taken a recent interest in judicial term limits. See Okla. S.B. 1729,
available at http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=SB1729&Session=1200; Ballot History,
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/835d2ada8de735e787256ffe0074333d/8a5ecf47562a
57e9872571e9005a9059?OpenDocument. The discussion of term length or limits has also received
some attention at the federal level, with several calls for changing life-tenure on the Supreme Court
to a single fixed term. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the
Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered¸ 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 769 (2006); Paul D.
Carrington, Bring the Justices Back to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/opinion/bring-the-justices-back-to-earth.html.
11. A breakdown of the various states’ systems can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The table is compiled from data using the 2012 Book of the States. See 44 COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 204-15 (2012).
12. This group includes Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and West Virginia. Id. Ohio is unique, in that its candidates are chosen through partisan
primary nominations, but the party affiliations do not appear on the general election ballot. Thus,
Ohio is a hybrid of partisan and nonpartisan elections.
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in fourteen states stand in non-partisan public elections, in which the
candidates’ party affiliations are not identified on the ballot. 13 Fourteen
states fill spots on their high courts through “merit selection,” 14 in which
a committee consisting of both legal professionals and laypersons
assembles a slate of judicial candidates from whom the governor must
select. Another eight states use a merit selection system in which the
selected judges must receive legislative or other consent. 15 Four states
use gubernatorial appointment, either alone or combined with legislative
consent. 16 Finally, two states use legislative appointment to select their
high court judges. 17 In addition, where vacancies must be filled in the
middle of a judge’s term, the state may use a different selection method
than is used to fill a vacancy following an expired term. For example,
most states that use elective selection methods fill mid-term vacancies
through gubernatorial appointment. 18
Retention methods can also be broken down into five categories:
(1) three states have no retention method (lifetime appointment or its
equivalent); 19 (2) eight states retain judges by reappointment by
legislative or gubernatorial reappointment, 20 and one state through
reappointment by the judicial nominating commission; 21 (3) nineteen
states hold retention elections; 22 (4) fourteen states hold non-partisan
elections to retain their high court judges; 23 and (5) five states use
partisan elections. 24 Within the various retention systems, term length
ranges anywhere from six years to life tenure. One state—New Jersey—
13. These states are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
14. These merit selection states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
Id.
15. “Other” consent refers to those states that require the consent of an elected executive
council. See id. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
York, Utah, and Vermont. Id.
16. California, Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey use this selection method. Id.
17. These are South Carolina and Virginia. Id.
18. See id.
19. Rhode Island grants its high-court judges life tenure. Massachusetts and New Hampshire
grant their high-court judges tenure through age 70. See id.
20. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
21. Hawaii is the only state to retain judges through reappointment solely by the JNC. Id.
22. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
23. These are Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
24. This category comprises Alabama, Louisiana, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia. See id.
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gives high court judges an initial seven-year term followed by tenure to
age 70 if reappointed and reconfirmed. Indiana has a two-year initial
term followed by subsequent ten-year terms. On average, states using
elections to retain judges have shorter terms than states with reappointive retention mechanisms. The mean term length is about 9.6
years for re-appointing states, about 8.6 years for retention-election
states, about 7.4 years for non-partisan election states, and 8 years for
partisan-election states. 25
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
CRUX OF THE JUDICIAL ELECTION DEBATE
A number of attacks on judicial elections have been launched by
commentators, including arguments that elections result in lower-quality
judges, a less diverse bench, and uninformed and apathetic voters. The
empirical data on these arguments is mixed—any quality disparity (to
the extent it can be empirically measured) between elected and
appointed benches looks to be minimal, 26 there does not appear to be a
difference in diversity, 27 and voter interest and participation appear to be
on the uptick. 28 Regardless of the merits of these arguments, and though

25. See Table 1, Appendix.
26. It is no small feat to measure judicial quality, given its multi-dimensional nature and the
difficulty of empirically establishing that one person is a “better” judge than another. Proxies that
have been used to empirically study judicial quality include U.S. News rankings of educational
institutions attended, citations to opinions by out-of-state courts, years of prior judicial experience
or other legal experience, frequency and severity of judicial discipline, productivity as measured by
number of opinions issued, and surveys among legal professionals. Early studies showed no
significant distinction between elective and appointed systems in terms of judicial quality. See Alex
B. Long, An Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18
J. L. & P. 691, 710 (2002) (“Some studies have found little, if any, difference in the quality of
judges from appointed benches as opposed to elected ones.”). More recent studies using some of
these proxies suggest a slight edge to non-elective systems. Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability
and Independence: Judicial Selection and State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 229
(2007) (summarizing prior studies in both directions and presenting survey results). In a recent
study, Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner found that appointed judges tend to garner more
out-of-state citations per opinion than elected judges, but that elected judges author substantially
more opinions than their appointed counterparts. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 290, 326-27 (2009).
27. Chris W. Bonneau, A Survey of Empirical Evidence Concerning Judicial Elections,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y 12 (March 2012), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120316_
Bonneau2012WP.pdf (collecting studies and finding “no relationship between diversity and the
method of selection”).
28. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 296-97
(2008); G. Alan Tarr, Politicizing the Process: The New Politics of State Judicial Elections, in
BENCH PRESS 53 (Keith J. Bybee, ed., 2007) (describing the “hyper-politicization” of judicial
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the arguments are relevant and important in their own right, the vast
majority of legal scholars agree that the central issue in the elections
debate is the interplay between judicial accountability and judicial
independence. 29
This Part argues that the concerns commonly voiced in the judicial
elections debate are retention-centric rather than selection-centric, and
that commentators who focus on selection in attempting to balance
accountability and independence are looking in the wrong place. In this
Part, I will first offer an overview of independence and accountability.
Next, I will examine three “core independence problems” identified by
Professor Charles Geyh in a recent article. I will argue that all three of
these core independence problems turn on retention rather than initial
selection. Finally, I will examine the accountability arguments typically
raised in the debate.
A. Overview of Judicial Accountability and Independence
Broadly speaking, both accountability and independence are
desirable instrumental goods for our judicial system—each plays an
important role in ensuring the rule of law and the impartial
administration of justice. Imagine a system with no accountability of
any kind: judges might accept bribes for favorable decisions, they might
render wholly arbitrary decisions (for example, by basing all of their
decisions on their own political preferences or whims), or they might
ignore or expressly disregard precedent or statutory language. 30 On the
other hand, in a system with no independence, judges might never
exercise judicial review to strike down a statute as unconstitutional
(without insulation from the legislature), might never decide a case
against the executive branch (absent independence from the executive),

selection in recent years); BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 3.
29. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 8, at 623-25 (recognizing accountability and independence as
“the pivotal disagreement at the core of the dispute”); Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of
Selecting Judges—Except All the Others that Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 277 (2005);
Pozen, supra note 28, at 271 (“Often, the debate over judicial selection methods is distilled to a
single tradeoff: independence versus accountability.”); Richard L. Hasen, High Court Wrongly
Elected, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1997) (“The debate pits judicial accountability, ostensibly
promoted by judicial elections, against judicial independence, ostensibly promoted by judicial
appointment.”).
30. Accountability comes in many forms and varying degrees. The norm of written opinions,
press or public reactions to decisions, the desire for promotion to a higher court, and reselection are
a few examples of decisional accountability. There are also means of holding judges accountable
for behaviors, without holding them accountable for decisions, such as judicial backlog lists and
judicial disciplinary procedures.
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or might be forced to conform all decisions to ever-evolving majority
preferences, 31 resulting in, as Alexis de Tocqueville once worried, the
tyranny of the majority. 32 Thus, both independence and accountability
are instrumental goods directed toward a fair and impartial judiciary. 33
But judicial independence and accountability are not “abstract
concepts with fixed meanings over time;” instead, they “depend on
context, and they have evolved in the flow of events and crises.” 34
Before we can search for a balance of independence and accountability,
we must know what these terms mean. From whom should the judiciary
be independent? For what, and to whom, should judges be accountable?
The answers to these critical questions inform the interplay between—
and the potential compatibility of—independence and accountability.
B. Judicial Independence
Those opposed to judicial elections rest their case primarily on
judicial independence. 35 Everyone agrees that judges should not be
completely independent; certainly, they should not be independent of,
for example, the rule of law, or binding precedent. 36 On the other hand,
we want judges who are independent enough to follow the law even
where it might create enemies of the litigants or of interest groups. In
other words, we want judges who are independent from improper
31. A hypothetical judge with no decisional independence would presumably be subject to
retention following every decision—term length is one way that judges get some measure of
independence.
32. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 103-109 (Stephen D. Grant,
transl. 2000) (describing the “tyranny of the majority” and noting that, “[i]n several states, the law
gave the judicial power over to election by the majority”). Tocqueville predicted that elected
judiciaries would “sooner or later be attended with fatal consequences; and that it will be found out
at some future period that by thus lessening the independence of the judiciary they have attacked not
only the judicial power, but the democratic republic itself.” Id.
33. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 455 (2008) (“In short, we seek to protect the rule of law and
simultaneously avoid both pure majority rule and the [arbitrary] rule of judges.”); Pozen, supra note
28, at 272.
34. JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 5 (2012).
35. See generally Geyh, supra note 8; Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important:
Electing Judges or Judicial Independence?, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859 (2010); Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends
in Judicial Selection in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 47 (2010); Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing
State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367 (2002).
Jed Shugerman, recounting the history of judicial elections in America, notes that “[c]ountless
scholars describe judicial elections as a ‘threat to independence,’” and then posits that the story of
judicial elections is “really to story of the ongoing pursuit of judicial independence, and the
changing understandings of what judicial independence means.” SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 5.
36. See Hon. Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces of Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 861, 863 (1998).
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decisional motivators—anything that would cause a judge to be partial
or otherwise unjust. 37 As Charles Geyh, a prominent judicial elections
expert, has put it, we want to maximize “good” independence and
minimize “bad” independence. 38 But this largely begs the question,
because one of the foundational issues in the elections debate is whether
the will of the majority should have any decisional influence, or whether
upholding the rule of law inevitably requires judges to disregard
majority preferences in every case. 39
I start here with the uncontroversial premise that the primary
independence concern in the elections debate relates to the potential
effect that elections could have on a judge’s judicial decisions (that is,
decisional independence). 40 But even this concern can be subdivided
further—the concern could be about either (1) selection-related
independence (that is, concerns that judges will include improper factors
in the decisional calculus by looking backward to events surrounding
their initial selection); or (2) retention-related independence (that is,
concerns that judges will base their decisions on improper factors
because they are considering the likely effect of decisions on their
chances of retaining their seats on the bench). Selection-related
independence looks retrospectively to the impact of prior events on a
judge’s decisional calculus; retention-related independence looks
prospectively toward contingent future events. 41
In a recent article, Charles Geyh identified three “recurring” and
37. Judge Kozinski argues that even proper decisional motivators can become improper
where they are assigned too much weight in the decisional calculus. See id. at 864 (“We have to
recognize that any of these areas of influence—politics, case law, morals, standards, personal
experience—may be perfectly fine areas for a judge to consider in making case decisions. The
question becomes how much?”).
38. Geyh, supra note 8, at 630.
39. This is not to suggest that virtuous judges would inevitably succumb to majoritarian
pressures in election states, or that they would inevitably legislate their own policy preferences from
the bench in life-tenure states. It only suggests that we should think about the normative role of the
judiciary in assessing the merits of various retention plans. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 186-87
(describing as a “judicial vice” a judge’s deciding a case based on fear of the loss of office or loss of
opportunity to gain promotion).
40. Some threats to decisional independence are not created by, or obviously enhanced or
diminished by, judicial elections. For example, a judge’s friendship with a lawyer on a case, a
judge’s indirect financial interest in a party, or a judge’s desire for promotion to a higher judgeship
all pose threats to the judge’s ability to decide a case without improper considerations. Even in lifetenure states, public opinion likely impacts judicial decisions. See generally David E. Pozen,
Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2131 (2010).
41. Prospective independence concerns are not limited to retention—judicial discipline,
media scrutiny, and public opinion may detract from prospective judicial independence outside of
retention.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/3

10

Keele: Judicial Election Debate
03 KEELE MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

JUDICIAL ELECTION DEBATE

7/1/2014 2:37 PM

385

“core” independence concerns related to judicial elections, contending
that the other arguments raised in the debate are largely “distractions.” 42
The three “core threats to independence” identified by Geyh are:
precommitments, campaign finance, and judicial re-selection (what is
termed in this Article as “retention”). 43 I argue here that all three of
these core independence concerns are really “the re-selection problem,”
or, put differently, that Geyh’s (and likeminded scholars’) concerns
about precommitments and campaign finance in electoral systems are
driven more by concerns about retention than by concerns about
selection. Both the precommitment problem and the campaign finance
problem have analogues in appointive systems, but these concerns are
exacerbated when judges are forced to undergo periodic re-elections.
1. Campaign Promises – The Precommitment Problem
The precommitment problem worries that statements made by
judicial candidates on the campaign trail limit the candidate’s judicial
independence. At the heart of the concern is the point at which a
position statement threatens independence by becoming a
precommitment to decide a particular case in a particular way. 44
Before we can probe the relative influences of selection systems
and retention systems on the precommitment concern, we must ask the
preliminary question of why precommitments should worry us at all.
There are at least four possibilities. We might be concerned about
judges (1) having general views on disputed legal issues; (2) announcing
general views on disputed legal issues; (3) having a commitment to
decide a likely case in a particular way, or (4) announcing a commitment
to decide a likely case in a particular way.
We expect—and even want—judges to have considered views on
disputed legal issues. As Justice Rehnquist once said in denying a
motion for recusal, “[p]roof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined
the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of
bias.” 45 In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 46 in which the
42. Geyh, supra note 8, at 631-38.
43. Id. at 625.
44. Id. at 636-37.
45. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972). “In terms of propriety, rather than
disqualification,” Justice Rehnquist distinguished between statements made prior to nomination and
those made after nomination, positing that “[f]or the latter to express any but the most general
observation about the law would suggest that, in order to obtain favorable consideration of his
nomination, he deliberately was announcing in advance, without benefit of judicial oath, briefs, or
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Court held Minnesota’s “announce clause” 47 to be an unconstitutional
speech restriction, the Court addressed the state’s asserted compelling
interest—preserving impartiality—by rejecting a definition of
impartiality that meant “lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view,” because all judicial candidates could be expected
to have such views. 48 Geyh agrees that this is not the precommitment
concern at issue—he referred to this as the Court’s “straw man.” 49
In a more recent article, Geyh posits that a judicial candidate’s
promise to decide a case in a particular way threatens judicial
independence. 50 He is right that we should not tolerate judges promising
to decide disputed legal issues in a particular way, but not because such
a promise limits a judge’s decisional independence (that is, not because
such a promise injects additional improper decisional pressures into the
judge’s decisional calculus). The reason we should not tolerate this kind
of promise is because judges should not have even an internal
predetermination to decide particular cases in a particular way.
Judicial disputes are “laden with all manner of supplemental claims,
factual particularities, procedural histories, jurisdictional complexities,
and doctrinal precedents that shape and constrain their judicial task.” 51
When a judicial candidate makes a statement that crosses the line from a
general view to a precommitment to decide a case a particular way, the
candidate so fundamentally misapprehends the endeavor of judging that
he should not be selected. If the candidate is selected, the new judge
should recuse himself in the cases in which he promised to rule a certain
way, but not because the precommitment creates additional improper
argument, how he would decide a particular question that might come before him as a judge.” Id. at
836 n.5.
46. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
47. The announce clause prohibited a candidate from “announc[ing] his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues.” White, 536 U.S. at 768.
48. Dimino, supra note 29, at 283 (“Judges often approach cases with an inclination about
the proper resolution. That inclination may have been gleaned from years of practice, from
scholarly examination of a related question, or simply a philosophical feeling . . . that the case
should be resolved one way or another.”).
49. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 65-66 (2003).
50. Geyh, supra note 8, at 636.
51. Pozen, supra note 40, at 2121. In this way, the judicial function differs from the
legislative function, which decides laws in the abstract. Thus, we might expect legislative
candidates to promise certain votes if elected. Some state courts have constitutional directives to
issue advisory opinions in certain situations, such as when requested by the legislature. See Neal
Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered
Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1651 (2010). But even this is
context-specific—the question will be, “Does law X violate clause Y of the constitution?” Without
the particulars of the law, a meaningful decision cannot be reached.
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decisional pressures. The reason the new judge should recuse himself is
that his prior precommitment demonstrates the judge’s refusal—at least
for this particular case—to include in the decisional calculus all proper
judicial considerations and constraints (such as the arguments actually
raised, the particular facts, the procedural history, and the standard of
review). In other words, a promise (or even an internal commitment) to
decide a prospective case in a particular way suggests the judge views
his role with too much independence, or at least with bad
independence—independence from legitimate constraints inherent to the
judicial role.
Having eliminated precommitment concerns that hinge on having a
view of disputed legal issues, and recognizing that precommitments that
constitute a promise or even an internal commitment to decide a
particular case in a particular way, though improper, do not substantially
threaten independence, we are left with potential concerns related to
announcing a general view that a judge properly holds. There are two
potential reasons that the announcement of a properly held general view
could be viewed as problematic. The first reason, which is easily
dismissed, is that the public ought to believe that judges come into every
case as a blank slate, upon which the parties’ arguments hold complete
sway. A theory that turns on public deception cannot hold water and, in
any event, the public recognizes that judges, like everyone else, have
opinions on disputed issues—that is one reason for the insistence on
judicial elections.
The second basis for worrying that the announcement of a properly
held general view is problematic relates to the effect of the
announcement on the judge’s future decision-making. This theory turns
on the argument that announcing a legitimately held view solidifies the
view in a way that would prevent the judge from reconsidering the
announced view (or, perhaps, from ruling in a way that might even be
perceived as reconsidering the previously announced view). 52 We might
call this version of the precommitment problem “open-mindedness.”
This view—and only this view—creates a true independence concern, in
the sense that we might worry that improper decisional motivators
(including, for example, the judge’s desire to save face, live up to
expectations, and appear consistent) are at work in the judge’s decisional
calculus.

52. See Geyh, supra note 49, at 65-66. This was Justice Stevens’ concern in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White. See Repub. Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797-803 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In White, the Court held that Minnesota’s announce clause could
not be sustained under a definition of impartiality that meant “openmindedness,” because the announce clause was “so woefully
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the
credulous.” 53 Geyh, criticizing White, has argued that the announce
clause does serve open-mindedness. Geyh notes that Supreme Court
nominees, citing impartiality, have long refused to answer questions on
issues that may come before the Court, even where those nominees’
views were already known through pre-nomination statements. 54 He
argues that “efforts to preserve judicial impartiality may be seriously
compromised” by the Supreme Court’s holding, which effectively
allows candidates to give their views “on disputed legal or political
issues.” 55 Independence is compromised in this case, according to Geyh,
because candidates who announce views “may well feel an obligation to
abide by their earlier representations.” 56
But it is “purely speculative whether the judge, having expressed
views, is more likely to decide based on them than if the judge has the
same views but had not voiced them.” 57 Perhaps the judge will
recognize the importance of the judicial role in such a way as to decide
the case strictly on the merits. Regardless, it seems most likely that the
judge would “usually do exactly the same thing whether or not there was
a prior expression of the position.” 58 But, even if one accepts the
implausible premise that announcement of a considered general view
creates some level of entrenchment that invites independence concerns,
it is far from clear that, on the front end, elected judges face more
pressure to precommit in this manner than do judges standing for
confirmation in the senate. Similarly, there is no obvious reason to think
that elected judges improperly precommit on a significantly greater basis

53. White, 536 U.S. at 779-80.
54. Geyh, supra note 49, at 66-67.
55. Id. at 64. It may be that Professor Geyh is less troubled by issue-based statements than
he once was. In a more recent article, Geyh recognizes “a difference between a judge who makes
clear his general orientation on questions of legal policy and judicial philosophy through a public
announcement of his views and the judge who promises voters that he will rule a particular way in a
future case.” Geyh, supra note 8, at 636. The difficulty, as Professor Geyh recognizes, is found in
statements that lie between these two extremes. Id. Judge Kozinski has also discussed the difficulty
of determining what kinds of statements during the selection process might improperly impinge on
judicial independence. Kozinski, supra note 36, at 865-66.
56. Geyh, supra note 49, at 68.
57. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 744 (2002).
58. Id.
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than do appointees. 59 Indeed, as Judith Reznik has worried, in the
current federal confirmation process “[b]oth the people and the ideas
become caricatures, and the peculiar decision-making processes of
adjudication, with its fact-full specificity, become lost.” 60
Presidents routinely explore potential nominees’ views on debated
legal issues, and “[e]very President in American history, to a greater or
lesser extent, has chosen federal judges, in part, based on their
ideology.” 61 For example, President Clinton vowed to “appoint judges
to the Supreme Court who believe in the constitutional right to privacy,
including the right to choose.” 62 Nominees are routinely questioned in
confirmation hearings about their positions on any number of issues, and
all Supreme Court nominees since Robert Bork have been extensively
questioned about their positions on the right to privacy and, more
specifically, Roe v. Wade. 63 Presidents or their high-level advisors
interview all potential Supreme Court nominees. 64 Thus, the potential
for precommitment infects all judicial selection methods. 65 For the most
part, it appears that judges generally have been able to draw “some line
between general questions, which they will answer, and questions that
may come before them as judges, which they will not.” 66
Although the precommitment-as-entrenchment concern applies to
both appointed and elective judiciaries, 67 the precommitment concern is
59. See Dimino, supra note 29, at 284. No judicial candidate had ever been found to have
violated the announce clause at issue in White. See id. Professor Geyh recently discussed the
precommitment concern raised by elections, and he raised a single illustrative anecdote involving a
judicial candidate who, by almost all accounts, made an improper precommitment, but who
ultimately recused himself after pressure to do so. Geyh, supra note 8, at 632.
60. Judith Reznik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 589 (2005). Professor Reznik does not decry the politicization
of the confirmation process generally, however. See id. at 631.
61. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 619, 620-21 (2003) (defining ideology as the “views of a judicial candidate that influence his
or her likely decisions as a judge).
62. Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Expected to Pick Moderate for High Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/20/us/the-supreme-court-clinton-expected-to-pickmoderate-for-high-court.html.
63. Rebecca Wilhelm, Giving Public Opinion the Process That Is Due: What the Supreme
Court Can Learn from Its Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 367, 375 (2009).
64. John Szmer & Donald R. Songer, The Effects of Information on the Accuracy of
Presidential Assessments of Supreme Court Nominee Preferences, 58 POL. RES. Q. 151, 152 (2005).
65. See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 982-83 (2007) (noting the concern that federal nominees “who
indicate how they would rule with respect to pressing legal issues . . . will be unable to maintain the
appearance or actuality of impartiality and open-mindedness”).
66. Id. at 1003 (describing this dichotomy in the federal appointment context).
67. A “merit selection” plan, in which a judicial nominating commission narrows the pool of
candidates for appointment, may diminish the precommitment risk, or it may simply make potential
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greater with judges who will have to face retention. If these judges do
not decide cases in the way that they indicated during their campaign,
they may be labeled liars and removed from the bench at the next
election cycle. In addition, they may believe that, because they made
this commitment and then were selected to the judiciary, this issue—and
the judge’s position on this issue—is important to the electorate, making
the judge more likely to adhere to the announced view to increase
retention chances. This concern drove Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
White. 68 She worried that a judge who made campaign commitments
may be unduly influenced to decide later cases based on those
commitments because “she may be voted off the bench and thereby lose
her salary and emoluments unless she honors the pledge that secured her
election.” 69 The precommitment problem, to the extent there is one at
the selection stage, exists in an appointment selection system. But the
problem may be exacerbated by judicial retention in an independencethreatening way. Thus, the real concern behind the precommitment
problem as an argument against judicial elections is retention-driven.
2. Campaign Support and Opposition – The “Campaign Finance”
Problem
The second “core independence problem” is campaign finance—the
concern that judicial candidates must rely on third-party donors. The
concern that I am addressing here is not the potential drain on the elected
judge’s time or that fundraising pulls the judge away from judicial
duties; perhaps surprisingly, re-elected judges are more productive on
the whole than appointed ones. 70 Instead, the concern at issue here
relates to decisional independence—that third-party donors may expect
preferential treatment in litigation before a given judge, or the judge may

precommitments less public, as an appointment system may do (when the appointing executive has
a private interview with the candidate). Merit selection systems have been criticized in that the
process is more opaque to the public than other selection methods.
68. See White, 536 U.S. at 815 (noting that a judge’s impermissible interest in a case “may
stem . . . from the judge’s knowledge that his success and tenure in office depend on certain
outcomes”).
69. Id. at 816.
Erwin Chemerinsky doubts that retention processes enhance the
precommitment concern—he argues that elected judges would jettison prior positions if the
precommitted position were no longer politically popular. Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 744-45.
But the campaign-conscious judge must also account for the political cost that inheres in waffling,
especially if the issue itself is relatively minor. The public may not elect a judge who appears
wishy-washy or who cannot be trusted to keep his word, even if the public disagreed with the
substance of the statements made.
70. See Choi et al., supra note 26, at 326-27.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss2/3

16

Keele: Judicial Election Debate
03 KEELE MACRO 3 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

JUDICIAL ELECTION DEBATE

7/1/2014 2:37 PM

391

be tempted, even subconsciously, to give preferential treatment to a big
donor. Even if neither of these is true, the public or the litigants may
perceive a threat to impartiality from such an arrangement.
The campaign-finance problem may be prospective, retrospective,
or both. If it is retrospective, it would center on worries that judges will
feel a debt of gratitude to large donors or campaign supporters, and that
this debt of gratitude may improperly influence the judges’ decisions.
To the extent this argument holds, it is a selection argument—even lifetenured elected judges could be subject to this debt of gratitude. On the
other hand, the concern could be forward-looking—that judges’
decisions will favor large donors or campaign supporters because they
want to receive similar support at the next election.
I posit, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, that the campaign
finance problem is driven more by forward-looking, retention-related
concerns than by backward-looking selection related concerns. To see
why this is so, it will be helpful to examine the issue in the context of the
quintessential campaign-finance case: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co. 71 But first, I will overview the empirical research directed to this
issue, to see whether the evidence supports a campaign-finance concern
at all.
a. Empirical Research
The empirical research on the campaign-finance issue is mixed.
Some researchers have concluded that judges do in fact demonstrate bias
in favor of campaign donors, while others have both attacked these
conclusions and presented research suggesting no demonstrable bias in
favor of campaign donors. 72 The mixed results are due, at least in part,
to the difficulty of assigning causation to a particular decision, even
where correlation is present. 73 For example, a defense-oriented law firm
may donate to the campaign of a judge who has defense-firm experience
and who favors defense-oriented policies. If the judge is elected, the
firm may be successful in most of its appearances before the judge, but
the judge’s proclivities would have caused the campaign donation, not
the other way around. Thus, we might expect some link between
campaign donations and favorable decisions, but that by itself does not
71. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
72. See Damon M. Cann et al., Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions in Partisan
and Nonpartisan Elections, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS 39-41 (Kevin T. McGuire,
ed. 2012).
73. Damon Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7
ST. POL. POL’Y Q. 281, 284 (2007).
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suggest that the donation created bias.
But, even with the uncertainty of the empirical evidence, there is
also a public-perception component to this criticism of elections. Even
if campaign donations do not result in demonstrable bias in favor of
donors, large donations may leave the public with the perception that
justice has been perverted. 74 This would detract from the public’s
perception of the legitimacy—the institutional integrity—of the courts.
The evidence generally suggests that the public believes campaign
contributions affect judicial decisions to some degree—a result that
would seem to undermine the perceived legitimacy of courts as rightsprotecting institutions.
Though surveys suggest that the public believes that campaign
contributions may impact judges’ decision-making processes, it is not
clear to what degree the public would hold this same perception in the
absence of any retention mechanism (where, for example, the judges
were given life tenure). Nor is it clear whether the public perceives
judicial bias in favor of appointing administrations (who will almost
certainly have more cases in front of a justice than any individual donor
will).
In addition, to the extent that the problems created by the public’s
perception of campaign finance issues are inseparable from judicial
elections (so that, to rid ourselves of the campaign finance problem, we
must eliminate judicial elections), we must consider the potential
legitimizing aspect of elections in addition to the delegitimizing effect of
the campaign finance concern. There is empirical evidence suggesting
that judicial elections enhance the public’s perception of the legitimacy
of courts as institutions, 75 so it is not clear whether the overall effect of
judicial elections is to detract from public perception of legitimacy or to
enhance it. Finally, to the extent elections are separable from campaign
finance issues, then this claimed problem is not so much an argument
against judicial elections as it is against the manner in which judicial
elections are conducted. 76
74. Charles Geyh wrote that “[r]oughly 80% of the public believes that when judges are
elected, their decisions are influenced by the campaign contributions they receive.” Geyh, supra
note 49, at 52.
75. James Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the Legitimacy of
Courts: A Survey-based Experiment, 64 POL. RES. Q. 545, 553 (2011) (concluding, based on
Pennsylvania survey, that “[e]lections by themselves seem to generate more support for the
judiciary; these data do suggest that courts do in fact profit to some degree from their periodic
encounters with voters”).
76. Selection-related campaign finance concerns could be mitigated without eliminating
elections, such as through public financing of campaigns, more stringent recusal statutes or a recusal
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b. Caperton and Appointment Analogues to the Campaign
Finance Problem
Regardless of the potential legitimacy-conferring abilities of
judicial elections and the legitimacy-detracting impact of campaign
contributions, the independence concern driving the campaign finance
problem relates more to retention than to initial selection. Again,
imagine a state in which judges are elected, but then serve for life. Most
people would probably be significantly less worried about this judge
hearing a case involving a major campaign contributor than a judge who
was up for reelection in eight months.
The Supreme Court recently had reason to examine the campaign
finance problem in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 77 In Caperton,
Massey Coal Co. and its affiliates were hit with a $50 million judgment.
While the trial court was deciding post-judgment motions, Massey’s
chief executive officer spent roughly $3 million toward the campaign of
West Virginia Supreme Court candidate Brent Benjamin, who was
challenging the incumbent justice. 78 Justice Benjamin won the election
by a slight margin. The trial court then denied Massey’s post-judgment
motions, and the case made its way to the West Virginia Supreme Court.
Caperton and the other plaintiffs moved to recuse Justice Benjamin from
the appeal, but Justice Benjamin denied the motion, concluding that he
could be fair and impartial. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the judgment by a 3-2 vote, with Justice Benjamin in the
majority. 79
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the campaign
expenditures created “a serious risk of actual bias,” such that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause required Justice
Benjamin’s recusal from the case.80 The Court held that the inquiry
board, or others. Geyh, supra note 8, at 640-41. Some states have implemented campaign finance
reform and offered public financing of judicial campaigns, with varying degrees of success.
BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 105-26 (2009).
77. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
78. The CEO, Blankenship, contributed the maximum $1,000 contribution to Benjamin’s
campaign committee, and then donated almost $2.5 million to a § 527 organization supporting
Benjamin. Blankenship also spent about $500,000 himself, on things like direct mailings and media
advertisements. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873. The Court characterized all of these—even the
independent expenditures, as “contributions.” See id.; see also James Sample, Democracy at the
Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, N.Y.U. ANN. SUV. AM.
L. 727, 768-69 (2011).
79. The court later granted rehearing and, with a slightly different composition, again
reversed the $50 million judgment. Again, Justice Benjamin was in the majority and, again, the
vote was 3-2. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875.
80. Id. at 884.
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“centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in
the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the
outcome of the election.” 81 Due process, the Court said, requires an
objective inquiry into whether the expenditures “would offer a possible
temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true.” 82 The Court also focused on the temporal
relationship between the expenditures, the election, and the pendency of
the case—at the time of the expenditures, it was “reasonably
foreseeable” that the case would be before the newly elected justice. 83
“Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears
of bias can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—a man
chooses the judge in his own cause. And applying this principle to the
judicial election process, there was here a serious, objective risk of
actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal.” 84
Was Caperton primarily about a “debt of gratitude” 85 for past
financial expenditures, or is there another theme implicitly at work in the
decision? What impact would life tenure or a similar term limit have
had on the Caperton court? Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito
asked this question and many others in dissent. 86 The dissent also noted
other potential “debts of gratitude” that could arise—and mandate
recusal under the Due Process Clause—in non-elective schemes:
“endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or
celebrities.” 87 The dissent also asked which cases are implicated: cases
pending at the time of election, or is a reasonably likely case
sufficient? 88 What about an important but unanticipated case? 89
The Court’s majority never discussed the retention issue, and the
petitioners mentioned it only in passing in their brief. 90 But it seems to
me that Caperton implicitly turns in large part on retention—that is, on
the concern that judges rule in favor of campaign donors in order to
curry favor for future campaigns. One reason to believe this is true is

81. Id.
82. Id. at 885.
83. Id. at 886.
84. Id.
85. This is the language used by the petitioners in Caperton. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.
86. Id. at 894 (Roberts, dissenting).
87. Id. at 895.
88. Id. at 897.
89. Id.
90. Brief for Petitioners at 31, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2008) (No.
08-22), 2008 WL 5433361.
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the absence of calls for recusal in similar, though admittedly not
perfectly analogous, cases involving appointed justices. Perhaps the
most obvious is Clinton v. Jones. 91 That case had recently been filed at
the time President Clinton nominated Justice Breyer to the United States
Supreme Court. 92 President Clinton’s nomination played a more
significant, more certain, and more direct role in Justice Breyer’s
ascension to the Supreme Court than the campaign contributions played
in securing Justice Benjamin’s seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, there was no widespread outcry for Justice Breyer’s
recusal from the case based on a likely “debt of gratitude” or appearance
of partiality, nor, apparently, did due process require Justice Breyer’s
recusal. Instead, it seems that the independence and insulation that come
with life tenure significantly diminish any concern about a debt of
gratitude that drove the Caperton outcome.
There are some other differences, besides retention concerns,
between Caperton and Clinton v. Jones that may account for the
differences in the constitutional recusal mandate.93 Perhaps it just seems
“dirtier”—because it is more subtle—to “buy” favor with money than to
barter for it through appointments. 94 But even if that is the case, there
91. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
92. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997) (noting that case was filed on May 6,
1994); Carl M. Cannon & Lyle Denniston, Clinton Names Judge Breyer to Supreme Court,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 14, 1994, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-05-14/news/1994134004_1_
judge-breyer-chief-judge-appeals-judge.
93. For example, the Clinton case had only recently been filed at the time of Justice Breyer’s
appointment, whereas the jury had already reached a verdict in Caperton. In addition, Caperton
involved the review of a judgment on a large jury verdict, whereas Clinton involved primarily the
question of whether a civil case against the sitting president must be stayed until the President left
office. Finally, the result in Clinton was not a one-justice majority, as it was in Caperton. Justice
Breyer did, however, pen a separate concurrence favorable to the President in Clinton, in which he
suggested that the trial judge should defer to a sitting president’s explanation of a conflict between
the ongoing judicial proceeding and the president’s ability to fulfill his public duties. Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710-11 (1997).
94. It may be unlikely (though not out of the realm of possibility) that President Clinton
nominated Justice Breyer with the foresight to know that his case would reach the Supreme Court.
But, as Caperton made clear, it is not the motives of the donee (or, by analogy, the appointee) that
matter. Instead, it is whether, “‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’” Caperton, 556 U.S. at
883-84. In other words, it is the “debt of gratitude” that the judge may feel toward the person who
had a hand in putting him on the bench. See id. at 882. As Richard Esenberg has noted, “it seems
plausible to believe that a ‘debt of gratitude’ may be owed not only to those who have helped to
elect a judge, but to those who have appointed him or helped to secure his appointment in states
where that is the route to the bench.” Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up, Must You Stand
Down: Caperton and Its Limits, 45 W.F. L. REV. 1287, 1297 (2010). And certainly appointing
presidents expect Court nominees to behave in a certain way—presidents “want Justices on the
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may nevertheless be an appointment-system analogue, because special
interest groups find it worthwhile to invest significant sums to support or
oppose a Supreme Court nomination. 95 Interest groups spent over $7.5
million in supporting and opposing the Supreme Court nominations of
Chief Justice Roberts, Harriet Miers, and Justice Alito. 96 And numerous
other cases exist in which appointed judges have heard cases involving
the appointing officials. As Judge Tatel on the D.C. Circuit explained in
denying a motion for recusal in a case against the Clinton
Administration, retention method—or, in his case, life tenure—matters:
Hearing a case involving the conduct of the President who appointed
me will not ‘create in reasonable minds . . . a perception that [my]
ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality,
and competence [would be] impaired.’ This is particularly true in view
of a federal judge’s life-tenured position and oath to ‘faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all duties . . . under the Constitution
and laws of the United States.’ Both Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer participated in Clinton v. Jones. Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Blackmun, and Justice Powell, all appointees of President Nixon, participated in United States v. Nixon. Judge MacKinnon and Judge
Wilkey, also appointees of President Nixon, participated in Senate Se97
lect Comm. v. Nixon and Nixon v. Sirica.

Similarly, one may also ask whether a justice would have to recuse
herself from a case involving a vocal or well-known opponent of the
judge. Again, the answer is no—at least if the judge is appointed to lifetenure. 98
An interesting recent empirical study bolsters the argument that
retention matters more than selection to the campaign-finance problem.
In a recent article presenting the study’s results, the authors first
Court who will vote to decide cases consistent with the president’s policy preferences.” GEORGE L.
WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS 58-59 (1995).
95. See generally Geyh, supra note 8, at 638 (noting “the formidable sums spent by interest
groups in U.S. Supreme Court confirmation proceedings”).
96. See Dorothee Benz & Jesse Rutledge, Three Nominations Reveal Contrasting Influence
of Interest Groups in High Court Nomination Process, JUSTICE AT STAKE (Jan. 31, 2006).
97. In re: Executive Office of the President, 215 F.3d 25, 25-26 (2000) (citations omitted; all
alterations except for first in original).
98. See United States v. Helmsley, 760 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recusal not required
where lawyer on case testified against judge’s nomination to court of appeals); Richard Neumann,
Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 375, 408-09 (2003) (concluding that Justice Thomas did not violate the recusal statute by
participating in Bush v. Gore, even though Gore voted against Justice Thomas’s confirmation to the
Court).
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conclude that campaign contributions influence elected judges’
decisions. 99 In order to test whether the influence stems from a debt of
gratitude or from retention concerns, the authors examined the effects in
the three states that select their supreme court judges using partisan
elections but retain them through retention elections. 100 The authors also
examined the effects of campaign finance on judges facing mandatory
retirement. 101 In both cases, the judges were no more likely to cast probusiness votes than were judges in the baseline categories. As this study
and the above discussion illustrate, the campaign-finance problem is not
so much that the judges’ campaigns received money in the past, but that
the judges expect to need to receive campaign money in the future. In
other words, the real independence concern in the campaign finance
problem is retention.
3. Retention-Related Independence – The Re-Selection Problem
As shown above, the retention problem is at work beneath the
surface in most of the concerns raised regarding judicial elections. The
worry behind the retention problem is that judges will tend to decide
cases in ways that mollify their retention agents 102—in the elections
context, that those subject to re-election will decide cases in order to
please the electorate. The empirical evidence suggests that this is
accurate: the policy preferences of judges’ retention agents impact the
way that judges decide cases, particularly in higher-profile cases. 103
This is true for all judges that undergo a retention evaluation, regardless
of how the judge is retained (e.g., by re-election or re-appointment),
although the impact appears to be greater in elective systems, with the

99. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011).
100. Id. at 102-03.
101. Id. at 103-05.
102. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 49, at 79 (“Simply put, a politicized process for determining
whether an individual will become a judge is less threatening to that person’s capacity to be
impartial and uphold the rule of law than a politicized process for determining whether that same
person will be permitted to remain a judge.”); SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 12 (“The key to
judicial independence is not front-end selection, but rather, back-end retention and job security . . .
.”); see also Alex B. Long, “Stop Me Before I Vote for this Judge Again”: Judicial Conduct
Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
1, 15 (2003); Dimino, supra note 29, at 455 (“The most significant problems with judicial elections
occur not because elections are used as the initial means of choosing judges, but because sitting
judges must run in elections to retain their jobs.”).
103. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38
J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (2009).
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greatest impact in partisan-election systems. 104 But, in legislative
retention systems, for example, judges are less likely to exercise judicial
review to declare a statute unconstitutional than in election systems (the
link, of course, being that the same legislature that passed the statute
holds the fate of the judge in its hands), and this effect becomes more
pronounced as the judge’s retention date approaches. 105
If judges facing retention are pressured to implement their retention
agents’ preferences, what, if anything, should be done about it? The
answer turns on a normative account of judging. Perhaps the only
solution is a retention-free system: either life tenure or selection for a
single, non-renewable term. But many in the political science field are
challenging the long-held notion that judging is fundamentally different
from our political branches and that judges ought to be independent of
the electorate rather than subject to it. For example, some argue that
“judges are political beings who make political decisions,” 106 and “like
other public officials, judges have considerable discretion and should be
held accountable for their choices, at least at the state level where we
would expect a close connection between public preferences and public
policy, as well as significant variations in law across the states.”107 In
other words, they argue, policy preferences will always influence
judges’ decisions, and there is no reason to elevate judges’ policy
preferences over the electorate’s.
To some extent, these election advocates are unequivocally correct.
Even election opponents acknowledge that judges make policy 108—a
premise that legal realism has left largely undeniable as a descriptive, if
104. Id.; see also Elisha C. Savchak & A.J. Barghothi, The Influence of Appointment and
Retention Constituencies: Testing Strategies of Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q.
394, 408 (2007) (“In states where citizen preferences are conservative, judges’ decisions become
more pro-government as retention elections draw closer, but in states where citizens are more
liberal, judges’ decisions become more pro-defendant in the face of retention.”); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L. J. 1589, 1625 (2009) (presenting
empirical research of appointed judges’ strategic voting).
105. See Paul Brace et al., Judicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions, Context,
and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1265, 1290-94 (1999); see also BONNEAU & HALL,
supra note 5, at 5 (“Broadly speaking, the willingness of courts to be active participants in the
checks and balances system appears to be conditioned by judicial independence from the other
branches of government.”).
106. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 138.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Geyh, supra note 8, at 629 (noting the “indisputable” role of judge as policymaker, and
collecting social science data); Pozen, supra note 28, at 273 (2008); Charles Gardner Geyh, The
Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1259, 1264-65 (2008) (describing “the policy-making role that state supreme courts play
when filling gaps in constitutional and statutory law and making common law”).
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not normative, matter, and that may be particularly true in state courts,
where the common law is still prevalent. 109 Similarly, judges have
discretion in many of their decisions. And there can be no doubt that
judges decide cases against the backdrop of their own ideologies—a fact
exemplified by Judge Richard Posner’s acknowledgement that he
accepted his nomination to the Seventh Circuit “[p]artly because [he]
was enthusiastic about advancing economics-oriented thinking in the
judiciary.” 110 Regardless of whether ideological-leanings are considered
“improper” decision-making influences of which judges’ decisionmaking processes should be independent, empirical studies repeatedly
demonstrate that judges’ ideologies affect their decisions. 111 To the
extent that “independence” means that judges should divorce their
decision-making processes from their own ideological background,
independence is probably an unascertainable goal.
But it goes too far to suggest that judges are no different from
political actors in the other branches. 112 What judges do is, in some
ways at least, fundamentally different from what the other branches do
and, in particular, what the legislative branch does. Legislators enact
broadly applicable policies in the abstract, rather than in concrete cases.
Appellate judges make policy in the context of concrete facts, and their
decisions are constrained in part by the arguments and record before the
court in a given case, and are subject to being distinguished in later cases
with different facts. State high court judges address cases “laden with
all manner of supplemental claims, factual particularities, procedural
histories, jurisdictional complexities, and doctrinal precedents that shape
and constrain their judicial task.” 113
Relatedly, we might suggest that legislators should always follow
their constituents’ wills, 114 but we do not expect or desire judges to

109. Devins, supra note 51, at 1649-51 (noting that “state courts are common law courts and,
as such, have policy-making jurisdiction over a wide range of subjects” and that state courts “play
an active policymaking role in ways that would be unimaginable for federal courts”); see also
Pozen, supra note 28, at 326 (noting that state courts do not have the same concerns of federalism,
separation of powers, and democratic legitimacy as federal courts, citing articles by Helen
Hershkoff).
110. Special Symposium Issue Measuring Judges and Justice: Interview: A Conversation with
Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1811.
111. See Choi et al., supra note 26, at 294.
112. Long, supra note 102, at 15 (“Even the most ardent supporters of the popular election of
judges acknowledge that judges are not merely ‘politicians in robes.’”); Dimino, supra note 7, at
361 (courts and legislatures “have different areas of institutional competence, which argues for the
maintenance of a distinction between their functions”).
113. Pozen, supra note 40, at 2121.
114. Some normative accounts of representative behavior suggest that legislators ought to
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always follow the will of the “impassioned majority.” 115 The concern
about decisional independence derives from what Stephen Crowley
famously termed “the majoritarian difficulty,” 116 which asks “how
elected/accountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to
constitutionalism.” 117 Put differently, if judges have a duty to vindicate
fundamental rights identified by the enduring or enlightened majority as
constitutional rights against invasion by the temporal or impassioned
majority, 118 how can we expect judges to fulfill that duty if the

enact their own preferences and, if the public sufficiently disagrees with the legislator, it can vote
her out of office. Other normative accounts suggest that legislators ought to follow their
constituents’ preferences, even if those preferences deviate from the legislator’s own personal
preferences. Also, Professor Geyh has said that, “[u]nlike legislators, judges do not represent the
voting public as a single, clearly defined constituency. Rather, judges must be mindful of multiple
and sometimes conflicting constituencies, which renders the term unhelpful and misleading when
applied to judges.” Geyh, supra note 8, at 629. It is not clear to me that legislators represent the
voting public as a single-clearly defined constituency, or that legislators’ constituencies do not
conflict. Nor is it clear, once we agree that judges make policy and that their constitutional
decisions are swayed significantly by their ideological views, that judges should never decide cases
in ways that “represent” the policy preferences of their constituencies. This would require a
normative account of elective judging that is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, judges
should not always bow to majority preferences, whereas legislators might be expected to do so.
115. The Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions in which it has used public opinion
or suggested that public opinion be used in making certain decisions. Most obviously, the Court has
suggested that notions of “cruel and unusual” punishment are guided by public preferences and
“objective indicia” of “national consensus.” See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554, U.S. 407, 422
(2008); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002). But the Court has also looked to public
opinion outside of the Eighth Amendment context. For example, in Miller v. California, the Court
stated that community values and attitudes should be used in determining obscenity for First
Amendment purposes. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court cited for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” 539 U.S.
558, 572 (2003). See also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 4
(2008) (“At least 123 Rehnquist Court opinions directly mentioned public opinion in a majority,
concurring, dissenting, or per curium opinion—an average of about six to seven opinions per
term.”). Moreover, significant empirical research suggests that public opinion plays a role in
shaping the Court’s decisions. See Laurence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares
About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1563 (2010) (describing some of this
research); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1020 (2004).
116. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 690 (1995). Croley’s chosen moniker was a play on the “countermajoritarian difficulty” famously articulated by Alexander Bickel to describe the difficulty in
justifying judicial review by unelected judges in a democracy. Id. at 693.
117. Id. at 694.
118. For present purposes, we need not take sides in the debate over the source of
constitutional rights (whether fundamental or positive). But, to the extent that fundamental moral
rights are protected by the federal Constitution, this may suggest a decreased need for vigilant rights
protection on the part of the states, because those whose fundamental moral rights are violated will
have redress available on the federal level. See generally Frost & Lindquist, supra note 7, at 796-
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impassioned majority is able to hold judges accountable for their
decisions by removing them from the bench? 119
Of course, cases in which public sentiment will be so aroused
against a particular party that the public is willing to ignore established
rights of a minority may be rare, 120 and even relatively “independent”
courts do not have a perfect record in this area. 121 But these cases might
be rare precisely because the public knows that courts will protect
minority rights from the tyranny of the majority. Most people
acknowledge the need, at least to some degree, to have a judiciary that
can withstand the ire of the majority. 122 Even if there is a place in justice
for judges to take account of voter preferences as a sort of tiebreaker in
difficult cases with unclear law and unquestionable policy
implications, 123 there is no place for judges to elevate interest-group
preferences over their own reading of clear positive law in deciding
cases.
The protection of minority rights from majority oppression is not
the only reason for retention-related independence. There is a related
concern that judges’ decisions will be improperly influenced by
concerns about the effect of the decision on their retention prospects,
even where the majority would support the decision itself or, more
likely, where the public has no obvious interest in the particular case. If

97. On the other hand, such a theory may place too much reliance on the availability of certiorari,
and it may undervalue more expansive individual rights recognized in state constitutions.
119. I have so far taken it as a given that it is the role of the courts to protect rights, though this
assertion is not without its detractors. Nevertheless, most people would concede that the courts are
the best-positioned branch to invalidate unconstitutional legislation and to protect the constitutional
rights of the minority from majority oppression in a democratic regime.
120. See Dubois, supra note 5, at 31 (“Constitutional decision-making involving alleged
deprivations of important fundamental rights and liberties is only a small portion of what state
courts are asked to do. State judiciaries are far more preoccupied with common law development,
statutory application and interpretation, procedural review, and the supervision of lower courts.”
(footnote and quotation omitted)).
121. Consider, for example, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). As an aside related to the decisional independence created by the
federal system, I note the unexplained assertion in a recent law review article that, “[s]urely, at a
minimum, those Justices who decided the Dred Scott case deserved to be impeached and removed.”
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 10, at 810.
122. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U.
KAN. L. REV. 687, 699 (2011) (describing arguments against elected judiciaries, including that
“elected judges may lack the will to defy the majority in a given case”).
123. Judges “can confine their populism to cases in which the legal answer seems uncertain,
while public sentiment seems clear, widespread, and of constitutional dimension (however this is
gauged). The people’s views would remain irrelevant to the application of, say, a fixed numeric
rule, but they might be consulted in construing a vague standard such as ‘equal protection’ or ‘due
process.’” Pozen, supra note 40, at 2082.
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the decision alienates large donors or other important campaign
supporters, it could result in the judge losing an important ally or,
creating a vocal enemy in the next election cycle. This is the retention
Retention-related
aspect of the campaign finance problem. 124
independence helps to ensure that judges’ decision-making processes do
not include a self-interested retention-impact evaluation. And this is the
core independence concern at work in the judicial elections debate.125
C. Judicial Accountability
Proponents of judicial elections largely pin their argument on
judicial accountability, but there has been little discussion of—and even
less agreement on—what is meant by judicial accountability. 126 Geyh
has suggested a useful taxonomy for judicial accountability, dividing it
into three kinds: institutional, behavioral, and decisional.127 As this
taxonomy makes clear, judicial accountability may take many forms in
addition to judicial retention: judicial discipline; 128 publicity; public
sentiment; legislative override; or constitutional amendment all create
some level of accountability. 129 But the most important accountability
for election proponents is a backward-looking version that seeks to hold
judges accountable for their decisions.
124. See Pozen, supra note 40, at 2099 (“In the new era of more vigorous races, there is a
growing risk that elected judges will play favorites not only with donors but also with important
interest groups (because of their clout with voters), political parties (because even judges in
nonpartisan jurisdictions will be aligned more closely with one side), political incumbents (because
sitting judges are incumbents, too, who stand to lose from antientrenchment measures), and popular
litigants and legal positions generally (because voters will be primed to punish rulings seen as too
generous to disfavored groups or causes).”).
125. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 7 (“Judicial independence has different meanings, but
at its core, it refers to a judge’s insulation from the political and personal consequences of his or her
legal decisions.”).
126. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 911-12 (2006); Michael J. Nelson, Uncontested and
Unaccountable? Rates of Contestation in Trial Court Elections, 94 JUDICATURE 208, 211 (2011)
(“In early work, Dubois argues that electoral accountability is present only when informed voters
have the opportunity to choose among multiple candidates at the polls and when judges who are
elected in such a system act in a manner that represents voters’ wishes. More recently, Hall defines
accountability as ‘a formal institutional mechanism where citizens control who holds office through
elections. The primary mechanism for this control is electoral competition.’ Finally, in their booklength treatment of judicial elections, Bonneau and Hall write that ‘accountability is “a product of
electoral competition, produced by the willingness of challengers to enter the electoral arena and the
propensity of the electorate not to give their full support to incumbents.’”).
127. Geyh, supra note 126, at 917.
128. Long, supra note 102, at 23.
129. We could call these versions of accountability “indirect accountability.” See Nelson,
supra note 126, at 209-10.
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Because the arguments of most judicial election proponents start
with the premise that judges are policy-makers like other elected
officials, 130 the accountability they seek is the kind of accountability that
will result in judges’ policy-based decisions following the electorate’s
preferences. In this regard, selection-based accountability can be
helpful, but only to the extent that the selectors can (1) correctly
anticipate the preferences with which they are concerned; (2) correctly
ascertain the judge’s preferences; and (3) correctly predict any shifts in
the electorate’s or judge’s preferences within the length of the judge’s
term. Of course, selectors always act with incomplete information. 131
Because the electorate cannot fully realize any of these three goals—let
alone all of them—election proponents rely heavily on retrospective,
retention-based decisional accountability to the electorate. 132
1. The Potential Meanings of Judicial Accountability
The word “accountability” is sufficiently broad to incorporate any
of several meanings in the judicial elections debate. For present
purposes, the various meanings of accountability can generally be
divided into two main forms, one of which relates to selection and one of
which relates to retention. 133 The retrospective, retention-related form
suggests that judges should be adequately held accountable for their past
actions on the bench, including the decisions that they have made, and
the best way to do that is to make them subject to removal. 134 This
version of accountability creates pressure on judges to issue decisions
130. See, e.g., BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 138.
131. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 10, at 845-46 (noting that “some of our most
liberal Justices were appointed by surprised Republican Presidents and some of our more
conservative Justices were appointed by surprised Democrats”).
132. By the same token, it may be the selectors’ inability to realize these three goals that
makes the majoritarian difficulty a back-end retention problem rather than a front-end selection
problem.
133. Some accountability mechanisms are post-selection, but do not necessarily involve
retention. For example, judicial conduct organizations often have the power to discipline a judge
with sanctions less severe than removal, including censure, reprimand, suspension, private
admonition, and others. Long, supra note 102, at 22. In addition, negative press or social
implications may not remove a judge from the bench, but they create some level of accountability.
These accountability mechanisms may impact a judge’s independence—a judge may hesitate to rule
on a case in a way that will get him lambasted in the press—but some of them are inevitable, and
most of them are not seen as a sufficient impediment to independence to warrant their abandonment.
134. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 7 (“[C]ompetitive elections promote accountability:
judges, like legislators, must answer to the electorate for their choices.”); Long, supra note 102, at
10 (describing a view of accountability in which judges should be responsive to the views of the
majority and “should be held accountable for their responsiveness (or lack thereof) by being made
to stand for [re]election”).
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that conform to majority preferences, and thus runs headlong into the
majoritarian difficulty. The other form of accountability is selectionbased, prospective accountability, 135 or “accountability before the
fact.” 136 The goal of prospective accountability is to attempt to ensure
that the selectors’ preferred judges are chosen to sit on the court, without
regard to retention-based accountability.
Weak, selection-based versions of accountability could mean
essentially representation—that the electorate ought to have some voice
in naming the occupants of the bench. Direct elections serve this version
of accountability, as might gubernatorial appointment, where the people
have an indirect voice in the selection of judges. 137 This representative
form of accountability does not conflict with retention-related
independence concerns. 138 In other words, a direct election of judges
followed by life tenure or a fixed term would serve one version of
accountability and one version of independence without conflict. 139
Some have discussed an “accountability” that arises with frequent
selection opportunities, 140 the implicit notion behind this being that
frequent turnover—or at least the opportunity for frequent turnover—
will help ensure that the court is in step with current trends,
philosophies, and prevailing views rather than being outmoded and
aristocratic. 141 This kind of accountability is incompatible with one
135. Geyh, supra note 8, at 637.
136. Dimino, supra note 29, at 469.
137. But see Pozen, supra note 40, at 2112-13 (“Appointive and merit-selected judiciaries . . .
do not hold out the same kind of promise to speak for the people. Their claim to institutional
legitimacy depends not upon their responsiveness to the present majority will but instead upon their
independence therefrom: They purport to be, not faithful agents or representatives of a constituency,
but ‘mere instruments of the law.’”).
138. See Comments of Justice Breyer, Justice for Sale, FRONTLINE (PBS television broadcast
Nov. 23, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/
interviews/supremo.html) (explaining that the purpose of senate confirmation of federal judges is to
inject “some element of public control,” but that “once the person is selected, at that point that
person is independent”).
139. This is theoretical—no state has a life-tenured elected judiciary. But, early in its history,
Vermont elected some judges to life tenure. SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 59. Jed Shugerman
contends that, at this stage in history, judicial elections were promoted as a means of separation of
powers rather than accountability. Id. at 58-59. See also Dimino, supra note 29 (proposing
elections followed by a single fixed term).
140. See Jackson, supra note 65, at 1003; see also John L. Dodd et al., The Case for Judicial
Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 359 (2002) (noting that the Jacksonian era ushered in
judicial elections in part because “the judiciary changed much more slowly than the elected
branches”).
141. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 10, at 771 (“[L]ess frequent vacancies on the
Court . . . reduce[] the efficacy of the democratic check that the appointment process
provides . . . .”); Pozen, supra note 40, at 2070 (“It should not be surprising to learn, then, that states
that use elections have granted their judges significantly shorter terms than states that use
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retention-related independence solution—life tenure—because it
requires relatively short term lengths. On the other hand, if a judge is
ineligible to sit for a term after the judge finishes her current term,
retention-related independence could be fully realized in a manner that is
perfectly consistent with this version of accountability. So, for example,
election of judges to a single relatively short term could realize the dual,
and compatible goals, of retention-related independence and turnoverrelated accountability. 142
Accountability could also be shorthand for the ability to punish
judges for improper behavior on the bench, such as “judicial
temperament, courtroom demeanor, and . . . speed and efficiency in
deciding cases.” 143 This version of accountability—which could include
removal as well as discipline short of removal, such as censure,
reprimand, or fines—is retrospective, because it looks at judges’ past
behaviors, but it is not decisional accountability. This kind of
accountability is compatible with the retention-related decisional
independence concerns, as long as sufficient checks are in place to
ensure that the discipline is based on behavior rather than decisions.144
Of course, at the margins, the distinctions between behavior-based
discipline and decision-based discipline could become blurred. 145
Accountability could also mean the ability to remove judges based
on displeasure with their judicial philosophies or interpretive
methodologies. 146 The retention agent might remove the judge because
of disagreement with a judge’s views of the constitution as a living
document incorporating a right to privacy or as an originalist, or because
appointments. For the choice to hold elections reflects a commitment to popular accountability that
demands continual satisfaction.”). Ward Farnsworth, discussing the Supreme Court, argues against
frequent turnover, contending that a court representing outdated views of American politics slows
the development of law in a positive way. Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the
Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 414-21 (2005).
142. Such a scheme would have other drawbacks, such as, potentially, lower quality judges
(because fewer lawyers may be tempted to leave a lucrative private practice for only a single short
term), concern that decisional independence could be compromised by a judge’s concern about
post-bench activities, and lack of experience.
143. Nelson, supra note 125, at 210; see also Dubois, supra note 5, at 36 (articulating one
version of accountability in which “the public was urged to be more concerned with ‘how’ judges
had done their jobs rather than with ‘what’ judges had decided”).
144. See Long, supra note 102, at 27-28.
145. Id.
146. Geyh asserts that “unintentional decisional error is [usually] attributable not to
incompetence but to honest mistakes [in] difficult and ambiguous issues of law and fact.” Geyh,
supra note 126, at 923. But it is hard to know exactly how he would define decisional “error”—is it
anything overturned by an appellate court, anything that it is inconsistent with a particular judicial
philosophy, or merely anything that he (or some group of people) thinks is in error?
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of disagreement with a judge’s strict textualist methodology for
interpreting statutes. 147 Alternatively, one might suggest that judges
should be accountable for the “correctness” of their decisions.148 Under
this view, judges should be accountable to the retention agent based on
the retention agent’s disagreement, not just with the judge’s
methodologies and judicial philosophies, but also with the judge’s
decision-impacting ideologies and exercises of discretion. 149 These
versions of accountability are at the core of the judicial retention debate,
because they are championed by election proponents but are
incompatible with retention-related independence. 150
2. Accountability Before the Fact
Some scholars have urged that selection through judicial elections,
without retention, would create a form of “prospective
accountability,” 151 or “accountability before the fact.” 152 But this
version of accountability before the fact, while it would presumably
appease election opponents for the reasons discussed above, is probably
not sufficient for most proponents of judicial elections. It is important to
election proponents that judicial decisions comport with popular
sentiment, at least in the range of unclear or discretionary cases. Thus,
for election advocates, pressures to conform policy-based decisions to
majority preferences are desirable. As Judge Posner put it, “[a]s long as
the populist element in adjudication does not swell to the point where
unpopular though innocent people are convicted of crimes, or other
gross departures from legality occur, conforming judicial policies to
democratic preferences can be regarded as a good thing in a society that
prides itself on being the world’s leading democracy.” 153 And, because
most state high courts maintain discretionary control over the majority of
their dockets, 154 accountability becomes a more important concern on

147. Although this kind of accountability is theoretically distinct from accountability for
individual decisions, in practice the two are inextricably intertwined.
148. See Long, supra note 26, at 709.
149. Pozen, supra note 28, at 277.
150. Geyh refers to these kinds of accountability as “direct political accountability for
competent and honest judicial decision-making error,” although there may be disagreements about
theories of judicial “competence” and “error.” Geyh, supra note 126, at 914-15.
151. Geyh, supra note 49, at 77.
152. See generally Dimino, supra note 29.
153. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 136-37 (2008).
154. Dolores K. Sloviter, Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 76
JUDICATURE 90, 92 n.25 (1992). Even in those states in which the court lacks discretionary review,
self-selection in the appellate process makes it more likely that the cases that reach the high court
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those courts and, arguably, independence a somewhat diminished
concern. 155
If prospective accountability could satisfy judicial-election
proponents, and if, as posited above, retention forms the bulk of the
independence concerns raised in opposition to judicial elections, then the
solution is simple: elect judges to lifetime appointments through popular
elections. If the accountability concern is providing for frequent
turnover, that could be addressed as well in a manner that pleases both
groups: elect judges to limited terms of a fixed duration. 156 But,
because, as discussed below, election-advocates have the much stronger
retention related version of accountability in mind, 157 prospective
accountability cannot go very far in satisfying election proponents. “The
motivating values behind the choice to elect judges—democratic
accountability, popular sovereignty, collective self-determination—
demand that judges be subject to regular reelection as well.” 158
3. Retrospective, Retention-Based Judicial Accountability
Accountability advocates have often assumed, without significant
discussion, that accountability requires “judges initially selected by
popular election and subject to popular review after relatively short
terms in office.” 159 They argue that judges, as policy-makers, ought to
take account of the will of the electorate, and elections both as a
will be the more difficult ones, because the easy or clear-cut cases are generally less likely to be
appealed.
155. Dimino, supra note 29, at 469 (“[W]here [state] courts’ dockets are discretionary, it is
unlikely that they will take a case unless reasonable jurists could disagree as to the meaning of the
law. Thus, the most sympathetic case for judicial independence—the judge who is punished at the
polls for performing his job in the only way faithful to the law—is rarely present when considering
elections for state supreme courts.”).
156. Id. (proposing elections followed by a single fixed term).
157. See Pozen, supra note 28, at 329 (arguing that the basic rationale for judicial elections is
to “ensure public accountability through regular decision points”).
158. Pozen, supra note 28, at 286 n.91; see also Long, supra note 102, at 11-12 (including in
accountability description that, “[o]nce a judge is in office, voters can shape policy by rewarding or
punishing the judge for the decisions the judge has made”).
159. Dubois, supra note 5, at 35; see also Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability
in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE 166 (2007) (claiming that accountability
is a product of competitive elections because they “enhance[] the ability of voters to voice
disapproval of incumbents and remove unpopular ones”); Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for
A System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 806 (2004) (“In making it difficult for
voters to remove an unpopular judge, merit selection gives up on the goal of judicial
accountability.”); Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the
Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2000) (“Proponents maintain that judicial elections
assure accountability to the people and are the only reliable method for removing judges whose
decisions are unacceptable to the populace.”).
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selection method and as a retention method help to ensure that judges do
this. 160 The selection-related accountability concern—that elections
“provide a mechanism for ensuring the popular control over the judiciary
that supporters argue is essential” 161—largely mirrors the retentionrelated accountability concern, but retention-related accountability takes
it one step farther. Retention-related decisional accountability seeks
periodic confirmation that a judge’s ideologies and decisions conform to
majority preferences.
Because virtually everyone now agrees that judges make policy,
few dispute that a judge’s judicial philosophy and ideological leanings
are legitimate grounds for judicial selection. 162 As Laurence Tribe has
said in the federal context, “[T]hose who interpret and enforce the
Constitution simply cannot avoid choosing among competing social and
political visions, and . . . those choices will reflect our values . . . only if
we peer closely enough, and probe deeply enough, into the outlooks of
those whom our Presidents name to sit on the Supreme Court.” 163
Assuming, then, that we accept the premise that a judge’s ideological
leanings and judicial philosophy are a proper selection criterion, 164
surely judges’ ideological leanings are also a proper retention criterion.
If it is proper to select a judge based on his professed textualism, or
originalism, or adherence to the view of a constitution as a living
document, 165 why would it be improper to subject the judge to periodic
160. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 2.
161. Long, supra note 102, at 10.
162. Dimino, supra note 29, at 463 (“The point here is not that those judges will violate the
law, or even that they will consciously shape the law consistent with their policy preferences, but
rather that judges decide cases predictably based on their judicial philosophies, and that a wide
range of outcomes is consistent with judges’ obligation to decide cases faithfully. There is a
tremendous difference between a Brandeis and a Van Devanter, between a Douglas and a
Frankfurter, and between a Brennan and a Rehnquist. One may believe that each of those Justices
faithfully applied the law as he understood it, and yet their jurisprudential philosophies yielded
starkly disparate, and predictable, votes in individual cases.”).
163. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT xi.
164. “[P]residents from Washington forward have chosen nominees based on their judicial
philosophies.” Dimino, supra note 7, at 349; see also JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME
COURT CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITES STATES
SUPREME COURT 223 (2007) (Robert Bork “killed his nomination by articulating narrow views on
the right to privacy”); id. (“Nominees since Bork have been closely questioned about Roe.”);
Kozinski, supra note 36, at 865 (“I think it’s perfectly fine for the folks who appoint judges, the
President or the Justice Department, to find out what the judicial philosophy of the candidate is.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 738. On the other hand, not everyone accepts this premise. Justice
Kennedy has stated his belief that judges should be selected not “based on a particular philosophy,”
but instead based on “temperament, commitment to judicial neutrality and commitment to other
more constant values as to which there is a general consensus.”
165. See generally INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
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retention procedures in which his adherence to the professed judicial
philosophies is evaluated? 166 On a more base level, if everyone knows
that judges are policymakers who interpret law in accordance with their
own ideological preferences, why shouldn’t those preferences be subject
to periodic democratic approbation? 167
Absent a retention mechanism, judges could toe the party line in
order to be elected without conforming their on-bench behavior to their
pre-selection rhetoric. 168 Thus, retention mechanisms ensure popular
control over the judiciary better than prospective accountability, because
retention mechanisms help to ensure that, once on the bench, judges act
in ways consistent with the selectors’ expectations. 169 The electorate
may not expect all of a judge’s decisions to comport with majority
preferences, but the judges were selected because, among other things,
the public believed that the judges would, at least to some extent, follow
a particular ideology, philosophy, or methodology in their decisionmaking. In other words, they were selected because they would decide
cases like a Ginsburg or a Scalia. 170

(Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1990).
166. Obviously, the majoritarian difficulty suggests one reason not to periodically reevaluate
judges—on some level, there are some decisions that we want them to be able and willing to make
even if we will not support those decisions at the time. But the concern there is over retribution for
specific decisions more than concern over judicial philosophies.
167. Croley, supra note 116, at 745 (criticizing the suggestion that “ideology should play a
role in selecting judges, but once they are confirmed, the need for judicial independence requires
that it play no r[o]le in evaluating their performance for retention”).
168. Or, to put it in the somewhat cynical language of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, there is a fear that a judge may take advantage of the fact that
“campaign promises are—by long democratic tradition—the least binding form of human
commitment.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002).
169. Where the retention agents and the selection agents differ, such as where one governor
appoints and another reappoints, or where the political leanings of the voting public have shifted,
retention mechanisms go beyond that—they allow the public to remove someone whose ideology no
longer corresponds with the public’s.
170. Few dispute that Justice Ginsburg is likely to decide many cases differently from Justice
Scalia. The majority of cases involve a fairly straightforward application of law to a given set of
facts, and even Justices Scalia and Ginsburg would agree in the majority of cases. But, of course,
all of the action is in the rest of the cases. More importantly, high courts, many of which have
control of their docket through discretionary review, are likely to regularly confront cases that do
not involve a straightforward application of law to facts, because these are the more difficult cases.
Party cues may generally provide meaningful insights into a judicial candidate’s likely decisions,
but no cue is as helpful as the judge’s prior decisions. See generally Long, supra note 26, at 696
(describing Democrat’s insistence that new judge be a Democrat in a legislative-appointment state);
Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20
JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (describing research showing that “party is a dependable measure of
ideology on modern American courts.”); Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial
Elections, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (2001).
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But retention-related accountability is not only about the
intentionally deceptive judge who would say one thing to be elected and
then act inconsistently. Election advocates have three other worries.
First, the judge may face issues that were unanticipated at the selection
stage in which the judge’s preferences or ideologies are out of line with
majority preferences. Retention-related accountability creates a pressure
for that judge to use majority preferences, rather than her own, to the
extent necessary to decide the case. And, if the judge does not,
retention-related accountability gives the populace a means to remove
the judge and replace her with someone who will.
Second,
accountability advocates are concerned about drift—either a judge’s
ideological drift away from the public or the public’s ideological drift
away from the judge. Ideological drift is a serious concern for
accountability proponents, and empirical evidence shows that
ideological drift is significant. The research shows that the ideology of
virtually all justices serving since 1937 on the United States Supreme
Court shifted during their tenure, and that the shifts have occurred in
both political directions. 171 And, again, if we assume that ideology is a
proper selection criterion, it is not obvious—outside of independence
concerns related to the majoritarian difficulty—why ideological drift is
not a proper basis for removal of judges. Third, and as a corollary to the
first two, to the extent election advocates fear their own inability to
accurately ascertain the judges’ preferences and the judges’ propensity
to elevate their own ideological preferences over the electorate’s
preferences in policy-laden cases, election advocates crave the
decisional influences—and removal ability—created by periodic
retention. Retention opportunities allow the retention agent to review
the judge’s actual body of work on the relevant court in making a
retention decision, providing for a more accurate assessment.
4. Elections as the Chosen Vehicles of Judicial Accountability
Retention-based decisional accountability could be promoted even
without elections. For example, gubernatorial reappointments promote
this version of accountability. In addition, while “we would expect
171. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 NW. U. L REV. 1483, 1519-20 (2007). Anecdotally, consider Justice
Blackmun, who supported the death penalty and then came to oppose it, stating that “when one goes
on the Supreme Court of the United States his constitutional philosophy is not fully developed . . .
And if one didn’t grow and develop down there I would be disappointed in that personas a Justice.”
Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Courts Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
707, 714 (1994).
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judges chosen by democratic processes to reflect the political
preferences of their states at the time they are chosen,” 172 the same might
be true for judges appointed by the governor, given that the governor, an
elected official, likely also reflects the prevailing political preferences of
the state. 173 Why, then, do accountability advocates generally champion
judicial elections instead of one of the other potential retention
procedures? There are three likely answers to this. The first involves
current conventions regarding reappointments, the second relates to the
common conception of democracy, and the third involves the immediacy
of the electorate’s voice to the decision-makers.
First, reelections may be the vehicle of choice for accountability
advocates because current conventions surrounding reappointments
make them an inadequate accountability mechanism. Most reappointers
are expected to reappoint without significant inquiry, and they generally
do so. 174 For accountability advocates, retention elections may contain
the same flaw—judges are retained over 99 percent of the time, usually
in very quiet elections without campaigns. 175 For some, accountability
is enhanced only through salient elections with sufficient challengers to
the incumbent. 176 These accountability advocates presumably want
judges to account for popular will and to elevate the ideology of the
populace over that of their own, at least to some extent. For them, then,
to the extent that judges believe they are likely to be retained regardless
of what they do, there is no accountability.
In addition, elections may be the preferred vehicle of accountability
advocates because they are democracy enhancing. In other words, in a
democracy, the policy-making branches of government ought to be
directly accountable to the public, rather than indirectly accountable
through the popularly-elected governor or legislature, or accountable to
an unelected judicial nominating commission. 177 That is the essence of
172. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 7.
173. The same is not true of unelected judicial nominating commissions. Elected judges are
almost certainly more likely to reflect the public’s prevailing political preferences than are judges
selected through a judicial nominating commission. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit
Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 676, 690, 700 (2009) (suggesting that judicial nominating
committees tend to pick judges left of the those chosen by the public or elected officials).
174. See Shepherd, supra note 103, at 171 (“[J]udges who are reappointed enjoy the greatest
job security.”); Pozen, supra note 28, at 319 (noting that the “state political branches have often
operated on a strong presumption of reappointment).
175. Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2006, 90 JUDICATURE 208, 210
(2007).
176. Hall, supra note 159, at 166.
177. Dubois, supra note 5, at 38 (“[I]n a democratic political system governed not entirely but
in the main by the principle of majority rule, judges should be held popularly accountable for their
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democracy. 178
Finally, and relatedly, if the goal of accountability is to have
judicial decision-makers whose policy-influenced decisions mirror the
electorate’s policy preferences, then there is a reason to prefer direct
retention of judges by the electorate over other retention methods. The
more intermediaries that come between the electorate and the judges, the
less likely those judges are to hold the preferences desired by the
electorate. For example, a governor could get away with picking a judge
whom the public might not have elected without significant political
repercussions on the governor, because this will be only one of many of
the governor’s actions upon which the public will base its decision when
the governor is up for reelection. The governor may be reelected despite
retaining an unfavorable judge because the governor’s action in retaining
the judge is diluted in the public’s evaluation of the governor’s
performance on the whole. Thus, governors can expect some latitude in
selecting and retaining judges before experiencing a significant drain on
political capital.
There is a downside to direct electoral retention by the public when
it comes to judges implementing policy preferences. If one accepts the
earlier-discussed proposition that judging fundamentally differs from
legislating because judging is a case-specific, backward-looking
endeavor, 179 then the electorate must, at least in some cases, understand
the individual nuances of a particular case in order to properly consider
whether the judge’s policies are in keeping with those of the public. For
example, before evaluating a judge’s decisions in capital cases, the
public should learn about and understand the mitigating factors that the
judge considered in imposing the particular sentence. But if the public
looks only at the general end result (that the death penalty was or was
not imposed), or, if sitting judges think that the public will look only at
the general end result, then the boundary between judging (case-specific,
backward-looking) and legislating (abstract, forward-looking) may
become blurred.
In dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Woodward v.

decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
178. At some point, it becomes infeasible to elect the entire government, and even in a
democracy, the people rely on elected officials to make appointments. But it may be important for
the citizenry to have a direct electoral connection with at least the top-level members of each
branch. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 7 (“Of course, the primary motivation for electing
judges was the recognition that judges are important political actors and as such should derive their
power from the people and not from a co-equal branch of government.”).
179. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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Alabama, 180 Justice Sotomayor cited examples of cases in which judges
overrode unanimous jury recommendations of life sentences in order to
impose the death penalty, and she concluded that the reason for
Alabama’s relatively high judicial-override rate was because of partisan
judicial elections. 181 In other words, Justice Sotomayor theorized that
judges think that the public supports capital punishment and, if they do
not impose the death penalty, they stand to be voted out of office. 182 But
if judges actually are considering the impact of their decisions on their
retention chances, and if they impose the death penalty against a
unanimous jury recommendation of life imprisonment, then the judges
must believe either (1) the jury does not accurately represent a crosssection of the public (that is, the jury recommendation is contrary to
what the general public would want if they had all of the facts) or (2) the
electorate will form an overly-general opinion based only on the final
result of the case (e.g., this judge will not impose the death penalty),
without examining the case-specific factors that went into the result. If
it is the latter, and if judges are basing their decisions in individual, factintensive cases on their perceptions of what the electorate would want as
a general policy matter, I suspect that even election proponents would be
troubled.
IV. JUDICIAL RETENTION
A. Judicial Retention as the Core Disagreement
As these analyses of independence and accountability show,
retention—not selection—is the primary source of disagreement in the
judicial elections debate. 183 Consider this syllogism helpfully set out by
Charles Geyh in identifying the most common argument against judicial
elections:
Major Premise: “Judges must be independent of the
electorate to uphold the rule of law and fulfill their
180. Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405 (2013).
181. Id. at 408-10.
182. Id.
183. Compare also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that lifetime
tenure during good behavior “is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws,” and that “[p]eriodical
appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to
[judges’] necessary independence.”); with Robert Yates, Brutus, No. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted
in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 350, 350-52 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966) (criticizing life tenure as
over-insulating the judiciary, entrusting it with too much power, and leaving it largely
unaccountable).
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constitutional role;”
Minor Premise: “[E]lected judges are not independent of
the electorate;”
Conclusion: “[T]herefore, elected judges do not uphold the
rule of law and fulfill their constitutional role. Conclusion:
Judges should be appointed.” 184
This syllogism is problematic for several reasons. First, I suspect
that the minor premise presumes (or alternatively, incorporates into the
definition of “independent”) that “elected” judges will be up for reelection. If they are not—for example, if judges were elected to lifetime
tenure—both the major and the minor premises would be suspect.
Absent retention differences, elected judges may not be significantly less
independent than appointed judges, because “[t]here is no such thing as a
nondemocratic approach to picking American judges,” 185 and there is no
system that fully insulates potential judges from discussing legal issues
or receiving assistance in obtaining the bench.
Perhaps more problematic, the “conclusion” within the conclusion
(that judges should be appointed) does not follow from the conclusion of
the syllogism (that elected judges do not uphold the rule of law and
fulfill their constitutional roles). There are two reasons for this. First,
the conclusion assumes that the only available methods for selecting or
retaining judges are elections or appointments. Second, the syllogism
does not address potential shortcomings in appointment systems that
interfere with the judges’ abilities to uphold the rule of law or that create
other problems not found in elective systems. In other words, appointed
judges may also be unable to uphold the rule of law and fulfill their
constitutional roles for different reasons (because independence from the
electorate is a necessary, but not sufficient condition) or they may suffer
from other problems that elected judges do not. For example, Professor
Geyh would probably agree that judges must be independent of the other
branches to uphold the rule of law and fulfill their constitutional duty,
and that judges subject to re-appointment or re-confirmation are not
independent of the other branches. The jump is to suggest that this
syllogism would lead to the conclusion that judges should not be re184. Geyh, supra note 8, at 625.
185. See Sutton, supra note 122, at 702-03 (“There is no such thing as a nondemocratic
approach to picking American judges . . . . [Federal] judges still must be selected at the outset by
office holders who obtained a majority, not a minority, of votes.”).
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appointed or re-confirmed.
It may be useful to construct a syllogism similar to Geyh’s but
slightly different, that attempts to prove the conclusion within the
conclusion:
Major Premise: Judges must not consider the retention
impact of a decision if judges are to uphold the rule of law
and fulfill their constitutional roles;
Minor Premise: Judges subject to re-election, particularly
judges likely to encounter high-salience, competitive
elections, 186 are more likely than other judges to consider
the retention impact of their decisions;
Conclusion: Therefore, judges subject to re-election are less
likely than other judges to uphold the rule of law and fulfill
their constitutional roles.
Here again, the syllogism is invalid, because the conclusion does not
follow from the premises. There may be different ways that other judges
fail to uphold the rule of law and fulfill their constitutional roles—
arbitrary decisions or decisions based on the judges’ own ideological
preferences, for example. But let’s put that aside for present purposes.
Even if the argument were valid, it is not necessarily sound,
because both the major premise and the minor premise are subject to
dispute. Potential attacks against the major premise have been discussed
above—accountability advocates suggest that judges who consider the
186. Election opponents have noted with alarm the increasing competitiveness and publicity of
judicial elections generally. See Pozen, supra note 28, at 267-68, 307-08. Election opponents, who
presumably accept the major premise in this syllogism, argue that, as elections become more
politicized, the public will lose respect for and confidence in the judiciary. Id. at 295. But it is not
clear to me that the “new era” of judicial elections is the cause—rather than an effect—of the
public’s perception of judging as a political action. It may be highly controversial and wellpublicized decisions themselves, or controversial publicized federal court appointments, that are
leading to the public’s new concept of judging, and that are in turn causing elections to be more
partisan, more politicized, more contested, and more salient. See Croley, supra note 116, at 788. In
other words, it might be that, as a legal realist concept of judging permeates our culture generally
and judging comes to be seen as a largely political enterprise, elections are becoming more salient
because voters are becoming less enchanted with judicial decisional independence. If society as a
whole is coming to view judging as a political enterprise, then competitive elections are neither the
cause of the attack on judicial decisional independence nor the sole vehicle through which
decisional independence may be attacked. Reappointments and retention elections provide a vehicle
for the attack as well, and we would expect to see these vehicles become increasingly politicized in
the decades to come.
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retention impact of their decisions are more likely, rather than less
likely, to fulfill their constitutional roles.187
But what is often overlooked is that the syllogism’s minor
premise—that elected judges are more likely to take the retention impact
of their decisions into account when deciding cases—may be assailable,
too. Empirical data show that judges subject to any retention mechanism
appear to take account of retention agents’ preferences in making
decisions. The data also show that the minor premise is accurate, at least
for now, inasmuch as judges retained through elections appear to be
more influenced by retention-agent preferences than judges retained
through other mechanisms. 188 But logic does not demand that this be so.
Instead, the reason appears to be more historical and conventional.
Accordingly, changing conventions would upset election opponents’
presumed preference for reappointment retention systems over elective
retention systems.
B. The Current Convention of Retention
Those who champion independence in the selection/retention
debate have generally directed their criticisms at judicial elections,
despite the potential for reappointment or reconfirmation schemes to
intrude on judicial independence in precisely the same way that has
drawn the ire of election opponents. 189 Anti-election commentators
often make unwarranted assumptions that (1) states that abandon judicial
elections will switch to life tenure; 190 and/or (2) judges in states with
periodic non-elective retention mechanisms, such as reappointment or
reconfirmation, will inevitably retain their seats on the bench.
The first assumption is unwarranted because it simply does not
comport with the data. Twenty-eight states use some form of

187. This is the dispute discussed in the prior section in which independence advocates stake
their claim on the majoritarian difficulty and accountability advocates rest on judges’ roles as
policymakers. To the extent that commentators on both sides agree that majority preferences are
sometimes, but not always, a legitimate decisional consideration, the battle becomes how to best
encourage a proper consideration of majority preferences while limiting the impact of improper
consideration of those preferences, and that is the subject of the proposal in the next section.
188. See supra notes 95-97.
189. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 116, at 743-48 (distinguishing the majoritarian difficulty as
applied to elective and appointed judiciaries, apparently without considering that most appointive
state judiciaries are not life tenured). In a recent article, David Pozen noted the potential loss of
independence from non-elective retention schemes. See Pozen, supra note 40, at 2118.
190. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 8, at 638 (“Without elections, re-selection becomes irrelevant
(unless one adopts a Virginia or South Carolina model, with legislative reappointment).”).
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appointment to select their judges. 191 Of those, sixteen retain their
judges by popular retention election. Of the remaining twelve that do
not use popular elections, nine subject their judges to some other form of
periodic retention mechanism—only three give their high court judges a
form of life tenure. 192 Historically, then, states that have chosen to select
their judges without subjecting them to popular elections have
nevertheless required their judges to stand for periodic retention.
The second assumption—that judges who are subject to nonelective retention processes will necessarily retain their seats—is also
unwarranted. The assumption rests on the current convention in favor of
retention; in other words, most executives or legislatures making
retention decisions are predisposed to retain judges up for retention. 193
But one could easily posit, and indeed one need not look too far back
into history to uncover, an era where the conventions on reappointment
differed quite dramatically from current conventions—the Declaration of
Independence complains that King George “made judges dependent on
If current
his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices.” 194
reappointment conventions were to change, independence proponents
should argue just as vehemently—or perhaps even more
vehemently 195—against reappointment retention schemes as they do
against judicial elections.
And it may be that current conventions of reappointment are
shifting. 196 In New Jersey, for example, Governor Christie has
191. See Appendix. For this figure, I am combining those states who select their high-court
judges by “merit selection” with those states that use some other executive or legislative
appointment scheme.
192. See id.
193. See generally Shepherd, supra note 103, at 171 (“[J]udges who are reappointed enjoy the
greatest job security.”); Pozen, supra note 28, at 319 (noting that the “state political branches have
often operated on a strong presumption of reappointment); see also Dimino, supra note 29, at 45657 (“From an independence perspective, it makes no difference whether the re-selection is done by
popular election or reappointment; in both cases, judges are made answerable—accountable—for
their decisions to an institution that is concerned with political results far more than with legal
principle.”).
194. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11.
195. Dependence on a single executive or small body for job security presumably threatens
independence more than dependence on the public as a whole, because judges would presumably be
able to more accurately assess the ideological preferences of a particular individual than they would
measure the changing winds of popular opinion.
196. John B. Wefing, Two Cheers for the Appointment System, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 583, 605
(2010) (noting that, until recently, no sitting New Jersey Supreme Court member had been denied
reappointment since the adoption of the constitution in 1947); Diana B. Henriques, Top Business
Court Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at D1 (stating that Delaware governor, in declining
to reappoint judge, “broke sharply with a tradition stretching back more than half a century of
letting well-regarded judges stay on the bench”).
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announced his intention not to reappoint “activist judges.” 197 He has
already refused to reappoint two New Jersey Supreme Court justices, the
first in a move that was “widely criticized as undermining judicial
independence,” 198 and he has hinted that the chief justice’s position may
be in jeopardy in June 2014. 199 In Arizona, the senate passed a bill that
would have eliminated retention elections in favor of periodic senate
reconfirmation, not as a means of depoliticizing the retention process
(that is, not because retention elections created too much accountability
at the cost of independence), but for precisely the opposite reason; the
bill’s sponsor said that retention elections resulted in too few of the
judges being voted off of the court, and hoped that senate reconfirmation
would result in more judges losing their seats. 200 The presumed
preference of election opponents for non-elective retention schemes is
not that non-elective retention schemes are inherently better or
inherently less independence-threatening—it is a function of current
convention. 201
The same is true of retention elections. There is a widespread
convention of retaining judges in retention elections, currently at about a
99% retention rate. 202 Some independence proponents have lauded
retention elections as a means of increasing judges’ independence
relative to contested elections, while many election advocates have
197. Charles Stile, Christie Urged to Heed the “Framers,” THE RECORD L01, May 11, 2010.
Of course, Governor Christie’s actions might mark merely an anomaly rather than a convention
shift. But the point is not that reappointment conventions necessarily are changing, only that,
unless there are constraints on the retention agents’ exercise of their power, they could change,
exposing any argument that reappointments are an inherently better system than electoral retentions.
198. Caroline E. Oks, Independence in the Interim: The New Jersey Judiciary’s Lost Legacy,
36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 131, 134 (2011); see also Richard H. Steen, Preserving Judicial
Independence, NEW JERSEY LAWYER 5 (Aug. 2010). After Christie declined to reappoint Justice
John Wallace, presumably over ideological disagreements, the Democratically-controlled New
Jersey Senate rejected two Christie nominees to the court. In August 2013, Christie announced that
he would not reappoint a conservative justice to the court because he believed the Democrats on the
New Jersey Senate would have denied her reconfirmation. See John Schoonejongen, Fallout
Continues from Gov’s Refusal to Renominate Justice, BRIDGEWATER COURIER NEWS 4 (Aug. 15,
2013). See also SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 4 (noting that “the politics of reappointment . . . can
be just as unseemly and corrupt as modern judicial elections,” but that “those pressures are also less
visible”).
199. Charles Stile, Christie Hints He May Not Renominate Chief Justice, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(June 3, 2012), http://www.northjersey.com/news/opinions/156882245_Christie_hints_he_might_
not_renominate_chief_justice.html?page=all.
200. Howard Fischer, Legislators Changing Selection Process for Judges, YUMA SUN, Mar. 7,
2011, http://www.yumasun.com/articles/judges-68260-system-gould.html.
201. See Pozen, supra note 28, at 284 (“Appointive systems in which the governor or the
legislature has the power to retain judges will suffer from the majoritarian difficulty to the extent
that judges believe their reappointment odds hinge on the majority’s view of their decisions.”).
202. Aspin, supra note 175, at 208, 210
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suggested that retention elections do not result in enhanced
accountability. 203 But the strong retention convention appears to be
weakening. 204 And every time a justice is removed through a highly
public retention election—for example, Rose Bird, 205 Penny White, 206
or, more recently, three Iowa Supreme Court justices 207—retention
elections are heavily criticized as impermissible intrusion on the
judiciary’s independence. The irony is that retention elections serve a
purpose only to the extent that they can, at least on occasion, allow the
public to remove from the bench those judges with whom it is
dissatisfied, but that is also the point at which retention elections are
most heavily criticized. Or, as Professor Geyh succinctly put it,
“retention elections ‘work’ only when they do not.” 208
As there are more and more highly public instances of judges being
denied reappointment or losing retention elections based on their
decisions, judges’ decisional independence is likely to be reduced even
if these publicized retention denials are largely anomalies. For those
concerned about the independence-threatening effects of retention
schemes, what matters is not the likelihood that a judge will actually be
removed from office, but rather the likelihood that a judge’s concern for
being removed from office affects her decision. Retention concerns may
enter into the decision calculus of risk averse judges, even if they believe
it to be relatively unlikely that they will be denied retention—for
example, it is not difficult to imagine that, as a result of Governor
Christie’s actions, judges in New Jersey will consider the impact of their
decisions on their retention prospects. In addition, highly public
anecdotes of judicial removal may lead a judge to believe that her seat is
more at risk than it actually is. The more that the judge believes a
particular decision is likely to impact retention chances, the more likely
the judge is, whether consciously or unconsciously, to include this factor
in the decisional analysis.209
203. James Sample, Retention Elections 2.010, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 399 (2011).
204. See generally id.
205. Roger Cossack, Beyond Politics: Why Supreme Court Justices Are Appointed for Life,
CNN.COM, July 13, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/07/columns/cossack.scotus.07.12/;
Voters and Judges, BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION (Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles,
Cal.), Spring 1998, at 2, available at http://www.crf-usa.org/bria/bria14_2.html.
206. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 644
(2009).
207. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?emc=eta1.
208. Geyh, supra note 8, at 639.
209. Judge Otto Kaus declared that he could not be sure that an upcoming retention election
did not influence his decision in a particularly controversial case. He likened the looming prospect
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All of this is not to suggest that one opposed to judicial elections
must be equally opposed to reappointment retention schemes.
Conventions matter, and the judicial elections debate reflects an attempt
to balance independence and accountability—when judges gain
decisional independence they lose decisional accountability, at least as
the terms are most commonly applied in the judicial elections debate.
Moreover, judges in a system with a general convention of retention are
less likely to perceive that any given decision will result in their nonretention, and it is the judges’ perceptions that result in the independence
necessary for them to decide cases contrary to majority preferences.
Thus, one might conclude that a system with a strong convention for
retention, but the potential of non-retention still available, represents the
right balance of independence and accountability. But, if one believes
that judges’ decisions should never be based on retention prospects or
that position-threatening decisional accountability is always bad, then
there should not be in place any retention system in which retention may
be denied based on judges’ decisions. These election opponents should
not be opposed merely to judicial elections as a retention system, but
should instead be opposed to any retention system; for true
independence advocates, only life tenure will do. 210 Focusing the
opposition on elective systems rather than on any kind of periodic
retention is shortsighted.
C. Other Retention-Related Factors Affecting Independence and
Accountability
If the key concerns in the judicial elections debate relate to the
impact of judicial retention mechanisms on the judges’ independence
of reelection to shaving with an alligator in the bathtub—you try your best to ignore it, but you
never forget that it is there. Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 735.
210. One still may desire checks on judicial behavior, even with decisional independence.
Even independence advocates want to prevent a judge from accepting bribes, for example. But
standardless retention, in which the retention agent retains total discretion as to the retention
decision, cannot satisfy the one who opposed elections because they cause judges to incorporate
retention analysis into the judges’ decisional processes. If independence advocates would be
unhappy with reappointment decisions like Governor Christie’s (and, of course they would), they
should advocate life tenure or else specific constraints on the ability of the retention agent to decline
retention. See also Reznik, supra note 60, at 610 (“A presumption, rather than a promise, of
reappointment . . . may mitigate the problems [with excessive independence], but the bases for
rebutting that presumption have yet to be clearly articulated.”). The same is true for the behindclosed-doors work of a judicial nominating committee who exercises reappointment power or has a
role making reappointment recommendations. See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 196 (describing
nominating commission’s decision not to recommend judge for reappointment, noting that judge
had ruled against a Skadden Arps client and that a Skadden partner sat on the commission).
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and accountability, there are other factors informing the debate. Many
factors impact independence and accountability by influencing judges’
behavior and decision-making processes on the bench. If we view
retention-related independence as the tendency of a judge to incorporate,
whether conscious or subconsciously, the likely effect of any given
decision on the judge’s chances of remaining on the bench, then there
are two ways to increase retention-related independence without
eliminating elections as a selection or retention mechanism. The first is
to lengthen judicial terms, and the second is to impose tenure limits.
1. Term Length
Because the heart of the debate about judicial elections centers on
retention, term length is a critical component of the debate. 211 All else
being equal, the longer the term length, the more independent the judge
will be. At the extremes, this is easy to see—a judge subject to partisan
elections with thirty-year terms would likely behave more independently
than a judge subject to gubernatorial reappointment every three years, at
least on average over the course of the thirty years.
Empirical studies show that judges become more likely to
implement the preferences of their retention agents as the time for a
retention decision draws nearer. Thus, judges decide cases more
independently of their retention agents’ policy preferences at the
beginning of their terms, and lose some independence as a retention
event approaches. 212 Longer term lengths decrease retention events over
any set period and, consequently, longer terms increase judicial
independence from retention agent preferences. 213
Thus, one way to increase judicial independence while retaining
popular judicial elections would be to lengthen judges’ terms. Currently,
non-elective states tend to have longer term lengths than elective ones,

211. See generally Hasen, supra note 29, at 1330 (discussing “the critical issue of the timeframe for renewal” and noting that “the best way to assure judicial independence is to extend the
term of judges indefinitely”); Dimino, supra note 7, at 349 (noting that the “threat to independence
is generated primarily by short judicial tenures”).
212. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004) (presenting study of
Pennsylvania trial court judges subject to retention election, and concluding that the “judges become
significantly more punitive the closer they are to standing for reelection”).
213. Brace et al., supra note 105, at 1291 (noting that courts with longer term lengths in a
gubernatorial/legislative retention system are more likely to hear challenges to abortion statutes than
courts with shorter term lengths, indicating, presumably, a positive correlation between term length
and independence).
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and partisan-elective states have the shortest term lengths. 214 There is no
reason this must be so. Presumably, the reason is because of the
retention-related accountability concerns: accountability proponents
argue that elected judges should stand for reelection often to guard
against ideological drift and to enhance the judges’ accountability to the
electorate. 215 But proponents of independence need not focus solely on
eradicating judicial elections in order to increase decisional
independence (which would, in turn, decrease retention-related
accountability). Term length is one area to which election opponents
could turn as an alternative. 216
2. Tenure Limits
Another means of increasing decisional independence without
eliminating elections is through tenure limits. Tenure limits would
increase judicial decisional independence because a judge ineligible for
retention on the bench has no incentive to issue decisions that will please
retention agents. 217 A judge who has life tenure is the most extreme
example—the judge has a single term limit. Judges who take office a
given number of years away from a mandatory retirement age have an
effective, though not explicit, tenure limit. If the mandatory retirement
age is 70, and the judge takes the bench at age 50 with five year terms,
the judge has an effective four-term limit and, all else being equal, we
would expect the judge to behave more independently during her last
term than during the previous three terms.
Once again, the empirical data indirectly back up the claim that
tenure limits increase independence. Although no states currently use
explicit limits on the number of terms a judge may serve, empirical
research has shown that judges who are ineligible for retention due to
mandatory retirement display no propensity to implement the policy
preferences of their states’ retention agents. 218 Thus, judges who know
214. Choi et al., supra note 26, at 299.
215. See Dubois, supra note 5, at 35.
216. Geyh, supra note 8, at 640; National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Call to
Action, 34 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2001). In addition, term length may impact the quality
of judges. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077,
1100 (2007) (“[T]erm length affects who wants to come on the bench and who will stay there.”).
217. See Pozen, supra note 28, at 283 n.81.
218. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 104, at 1625 (presenting empirical research demonstrating
that appointed judges tend to vote in ways to curry favor with their retention agents, but that this
“strategic voting . . . is almost nonexistent among judges with life tenure or those facing mandatory
retirement”); Shepherd, supra note 103, at 169 (showing that decisions of judges of all retention
methods are influenced, to some degree, by the political stance of retention agents, but, where the
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they will not face retention render decisions less influenced by retention
agents’ preferences than judges subject to retention.
These kinds of limits are not without their detractors. For example,
the National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection issued a “Call to
Action,” in which it recommended that states should increase term
lengths, but followed up this recommendation by stating that “[t]erm
limits, whatever their merits for representative positions, are not
appropriate for judicial office.” 219 The Summit offered no explanation
for this assertion, and it very well may have been self-serving—the
summit consisted of the chief justices of seventeen states’ high courts
and others selected by those chief justices.
One commentator has argued that “[t]he major fallacy in the
argument in favor of judicial term limits is the assumption that, like state
senators and mayors, judges are political officials.” 220 He went on to
argue that, “[e]ven if [he] agreed that judges should be less independent
and more responsive to the will of the majority . . . judicial term limits
would not achieve that result.” 221 But this is exactly the point. The
argument for term limits in this Article is that term limits will enhance—
not decrease—judicial independence by allowing judges during their
final terms to render decisions absent retention-related constraints.
Because judges must sometimes reach decisions that may be unpopular,
term limits protect them against a retention incentive to avoid such
decisions.
V. A PROPOSAL
Having established that retention, rather than selection, is the
driving force in the independence/accountability debate, and that term
length and term limits can enhance independence even in elected
systems, we can propose a system that takes advantage of term length
and term limits to minimize the majoritarian difficulty while allowing
for retention-related accountability and enough turnover to ensure that
the court’s ideology is consistent with—or at least follows closely
behind—that of the populace. Such a system may serve to better
balance the values of each side in the debate. My proposal is to use a

judge is not eligible for retention (has reached mandatory retirement age in the 37 states that impose
mandatory retirement), retention agents’ politics play no or a very slight role).
219. National Summit, supra note 216, at 1355.
220. Marshall A. Snider, Term Limits for Judges: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 37
COLO. LAW. 43 (Feb. 2008).
221. Id.
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two-term system to fill state high courts, 222 in which high court judges
sit for an initial term of relatively short duration (for example, five or six
years) followed by a longer, final term (for example, ten or twelve
years), after which the judge will be ineligible for further retention.
A. Strengths
This proposal reflects an attempt to provide some level of the kind
of accountability sought by election proponents while reducing concerns
related to the majoritarian difficulty. Relative to a pure contested
elective retention system, this proposal offers increased independence to
the judiciary to protect the rights of unpopular litigants or to strike down
popular legislation. Relative to a lifetime appointment system or a
single-term system (both of which offer the potential of prospective
accountability, but offer no retention-related accountability), this
proposal offers more retention-related decisional accountability. This
proposal also offers prospective accountability by allowing for (but not
requiring) popular elections, as well as the ability to turn the court over
more frequently than in life-tenure or single-term systems, which in turn
increases “the political accountability of a branch of the . . . government
that has become a major policy-making institution.” 223
For election advocates, this proposal offers some protection against
ideological drift, campaign misrepresentations, or unanticipated issues,
and allows the retention agent to more accurately assess the judge’s
ideologies by reviewing an actual body of work on the relevant court
instead of merely extrapolating from other information. 224 Short single
terms could offer some protection against ideological drift while
providing relative independence, but the complete absence of any
retention-related accountability makes them unlikely to win the support
of judicial elections proponents, and short single terms would likely
diminish the quality of the judiciary by eliminating experience on the
222. This proposal, like the rest of this Article, is directed toward state high courts. As Jed
Shugerman has pointed out, “[a]ppellate courts engage in a combined role of adjudication,
lawmaking, and general interpretation, so it makes more sense under democratic theory for these
judges to be more accountable to the public.” SHUGERMAN, supra note 34, at 60. The
policymaking role of the courts is even more pronounced in the highest courts, especially where
those courts have discretionary jurisdiction.
223. PAUL D. CARRINGTON & ROGER C. CRAMTON, REFORMING THE COURT 8 (2006) (“The
popular will of an electorate that is guaranteed ‘a Republican Form of Government’ is increasingly
governed by a non-accountable gerontocracy.”).
224. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 10, at 845-46 (noting that “some of our most
liberal Justices were appointed by surprised Republican Presidents and some of our more
conservative Justices were appointed by surprised Democrats”).
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court and discouraging qualified lawyers from seeking judgeships.
Moreover, through properly staggered the terms, this proposal
allows states to maintain a majority of the court independent from
retention-related pressures, which should reduce concerns about the
majoritarian difficulty. Because judges are retained more often than
not—the lowest retention rate is in states with partisan elections, and that
rate is about 69 percent 225—the terms could be staggered so that, under
this system, the court would almost always be composed of a majority of
members who are ineligible for retention, giving a majority of the court
enhanced retention-related decisional independence.
In sum, the proposal provides election opponents with some of the
independence that they seek, election proponents with some of the
accountability that they seek, but gives neither side everything that it
seeks.
B. Potential Criticisms and Responses
The proposal outlined above is not without potential weaknesses.
The most obvious one is the possibility that both sides would be left
dissatisfied, with accountability advocates maintaining that it provides
insufficient retention-related accountability and independence advocates
arguing that it provides insufficient independence from retention-related
decisional pressures. This is most likely to be the case between two
groups: (1) accountability advocates who argue that decisional
independence is not necessary for the courts’ rights-protection work or
for judicial review, and (2) independence advocates who contend that
majority preferences are never, or almost never, appropriate decisional
influences at the state supreme court level. For these extreme views, an
agreeable balance is impossible, because there is no room for
compromise.
There are a few additional potential criticisms of this proposal.
First, perhaps fewer candidates would be willing to leave stable,
lucrative, or otherwise rewarding practices to take a spot on the bench
with a fixed term. 226 But, under this proposal, and depending on the
length of terms selected, the average tenure of judges in most elective
states may very well remain stable or even increase.227 Thus, would-be
225. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 84.
226. Hamilton thought this would be the case. In THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, he argued that “a
temporary duration in office . . . would naturally discourage [qualified lawyers] from quitting a
lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench.”
227. If we use the six and twelve year terms used in the example above, if we assume that
reelection rates would hold at roughly two-thirds, and if all judges served their full terms, then the
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judges in these states are unlikely to be deterred by the inability to serve
a third term after, for example, fifteen or eighteen years on the bench. In
addition, there is probably sufficient incentive to serve through the
additional prestige and reputational enhancement that comes with having
served as a justice on the state’s highest court.
Another potential drawback is that states may lose some judicial
experience. 228 Even in states where the mean tenure is relatively low,
there may be a long-tenured judge who is able to provide advice and
guidance to newer judges. Under the proposal presented here, no judge
would be able to serve for longer than the two-term limit (eighteen years
in the six- and twelve- year example used above). Oklahoma’s chief
justice, discussing term limits on judges, raised this concern, claiming
that he was a “better” judge in his eighteenth year than in his tenth. 229
That said, and, again, depending on the length of terms used, the
experience may not be significantly different from where it stands now,
at least in most states.
There could also be some decline in productivity (and, potentially, a
corresponding increase in opinion “quality”) in election states. One
empirical study found that judges retained by reappointment pen fewer
opinions than judges retained through elections, but that those opinions
are cited more often by courts outside of the state (which the study used
as a proxy for opinion quality). 230 It is not clear whether re-elected
judges ineligible for re-election would become less industrious and/or
mean tenure under this proposal would be fourteen years (two judges would serve eighteen years for
every one who served six). This is significantly higher than the current mean tenure in partisan
elected states. See Choi et al., supra note 26, at 294 (showing a mean tenure for active judges of 6.7
in partisan election states, 7.1 in non-partisan election states, 9.2 in appointment retention states, and
10.0 in retention election states); see also Todd A. Curry & Mark S. Hurwitz, Does Risk Vary,
Institutional Effects on the Careers of State Supreme Court Justices, (working paper) available at
http://www.toddacurry.com/data/Risk.pdf (showing a mean tenure for departed judges of 8.3 years
in partisan election systems, 8.7 years in non-partisan election systems, 9.3 years in appointment
retention systems, and 11.3 years in retention election systems). Some judges may retire or die prior
to their term expiring, so the mean under the proposal would be somewhat less then fourteen years.
Nevertheless, it is likely to be higher than the current mean in most systems.
228. In THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, Hamilton offered judicial experience as a secondary reason
for life tenure of judges, when he noted that the “precedents must unavoidably swell to a very
considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of
them.”
229. Justice Taylor also claimed that “[j]udging is a craft” and an “art.” Barbara Hoberock,
Term Limits for Judges a Bad Idea, Oklahoma’s Chief Justice Says, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 4, 2012,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=20120204_16_A15_CUTLI
N246250. If, by “better,” Justice Taylor meant more efficient, then few would disagree that this is
objectively better. But if Justice Taylor instead meant that his ideologies and interpretive methods
had changed over time, this might be exactly the drift that concerns election advocates.
230. Choi et al., supra note 26, at 326-27.
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more thoughtful in their opinions (that is, could start behaving more like
life-tenured judges in this respect), but the possibility exists.
In addition, this proposal may result in marginally less decisional
independence than a life-tenure system or a system offering tenure at
least through the judge’s working years, even for judges who are
ineligible for retention. Although the judge will no longer have an
incentive to base a decision on the potential effect of the decision on the
judge’s retention chances, the judge may be concerned about pleasing
potential employers after the judge has left the bench. But this risk
seems relatively low, for at least two reasons. First, the judge’s position
on the state’s high court makes the judge likely to be highly sought-after
in private practice, both by clients and by potential employers. Thus, the
judge is unlikely to be very concerned about potentially alienating any
particular potential client or employer with a decision or opinion.
Second, if the terms added up to eighteen years (a six-year term
followed by a twelve-year term), judges who are retained for a second
term (the only ones that are at issue for purposes of this concern) are
likely to be at or close to retirement age, or at least an age where active
full-time employment is not a necessity. Thus, while the proposal would
have some detractors, the criticisms seem relatively minor, especially for
the gains in independence. Of course, a jurisdiction adopting this system
from a short-term partisan-election retention system would lose some
retention-related accountability, but it may be worth it to ameliorate—
though not completely eliminate—the majoritarian difficulty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The judicial elections debate has raged for many years, and its
resolution does not appear imminent. Nevertheless, this Article has
endeavored to inform the debate in several ways. First, the Article has
attempted to show that the core concerns in the judicial elections
debate—independence and accountability—relate more to the way
judges are retained than the way that they are selected. Building on this,
this Article suggests that any system of retention in which the retention
agent is able to deny retention to a sitting judge based on the judge’s
decisions gives rise to the same independence concerns raised by
election opponents, though not necessarily to the same degree. Finally,
because the thrust of election opponents’ arguments go to retention
procedures, this Article identifies two additional retention-related
considerations, other than the mechanism for retention, that inform the
accountability/independence debate: term length and tenure limits. This
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Article uses these two additional considerations to propose a new
retention system, employing a relatively short initial term followed by a
longer, and final, second term, in order to better balance retentionrelated decisional independence and retention-related accountability.
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APPENDIX – JUDICIAL SELECTION AND RETENTION METHODS AND
TERM LENGTHS
State

Selection Retention Term

Mean Terms

Alabama

PE

PE

6

Alaska

MS - G

RE

10

PE

8

Mean
Term
8.5

Arizona

MS - G

RE

6

NPE

14

7.428571

Arkansas

NPE

NPE

8

MS (Any)

20

8.7

California

G

RE

12

9.6

Colorado

MS - G

RE

10

G, L, GE, or 5
GL
47

Connecticut

MS - GL MS - GL

8

Delaware

MS - GL MS - GL

12

Florida

MS - G

RE

6

PE

5

8

Georgia

NPE

NPE

6

NPE

14

7.428571

Hawaii

MS - GL JNC

10

RE

19

8.631579

Idaho

NPE

NPE

6

MS, G, L, or 9
GL

Illinois

PE

RE

10

Indiana

MS - G

RE

10

Iowa

MS - G

RE

8

Kansas

MS - G

RE

6

Kentucky

NPE

NPE

8

Louisiana

PE

PE

10

Maine

GL

GL

7

Maryland

MS - GL RE

Selection

Retention

Number

Number

Mean
Term

9.555556

10

Massachusetts MS - GE Tenure - 70 N/A
Michigan

NPE

NPE

8

Minnesota

NPE

NPE

6

Mississippi

NPE

NPE

8

Missouri

MS - G

RE

12

Montana

NPE

NPE

8

Nebraska

MS - G

RE

6

Nevada

NPE

NPE

6

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

GE

Tenure - 70 N/A

GL

GL
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New Mexico

PE

RE

New York

MS - GL MS - GL

[47:375

8
14

North Carolina NPE

NPE

8

North Dakota

NPE

NPE

10

Ohio

PE

PE

6

Oklahoma

MS - G

RE

6

Oregon

NPE

NPE

6

Pennsylvania

PE

RE

10

Rhode Island

MS - G

Tenure - Lf

N/A

South Carolina L

L

10

South Dakota

MS - G

RE

8

Tennessee

MS - G

RE

8

Texas

PE

PE

6

Utah

MS - GL RE

10

Vermont

MS - GL L

6

Virginia

L

L

12

Washington

NPE

NPE

6

West Virginia PE

PE

12

Wisconsin

NPE

NPE

10

Wyoming

MS - G

RE

8

PE = Partisan elections.
NPE = Non-partisan elections.
L = Legislative appointment.
G = Gubernatorial appointment.
RE = Retention elections.
JNC = Judicial nominating commission.

**The idiosyncrasies in some states’ systems create categorization
difficulties, so that a chart such as this one includes some judgment calls.
As one such example, New Jersey’s high court justices are reappointed
after an initial seven-year term, but once a justice is reappointed, she has
tenure until age 70. The chart does not capture this nuance.
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